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Articles
Incompetent but Deportable:
The Case for a Right to Mental Competence in
Removal Proceedings
Fatma E. Marouf*
Important strides are currently being made toward increasing procedural due process
protections for noncitizens with serious mental disabilities in removal proceedings, such
as providing them with competency hearings and appointed counsel. This Article goes
even further, arguing that courts should recognize a substantive due process right to
competence in removal proceedings, which would prevent those found mentally
incompetent from being deported. Recognizing a right to competence in a quasi-criminal
proceeding such as removal would not be unprecedented, as most states already
recognize this right in juvenile adjudication proceedings. The Article demonstrates that
the same reasons underlying the prohibition against trial of incompetent defendants apply
to removal proceedings. Competence is necessary to protect the fairness and accuracy of
the proceedings, safeguard statutory and constitutional rights, uphold the prohibition
against in absentia hearings, and preserve the moral dignity of the process. In addition
removal can represent an extension of the criminal process. This Article explores
potential concerns about recognizing a right to competence, such as exposing the
respondent to indefinite civil commitment and forfeiting the opportunity to pursue
applications that could lead to being granted legal status by the immigration court. A
closer examination of these concerns suggests that they may be less serious than they
initially appear. Finally, the Article explores some alternatives to recognizing a right to
competence and explains why they fail to provide sufficient protection.
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Introduction
While the prohibition against trying mentally incompetent
defendants has deep roots in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the rights
of incompetent individuals in civil proceedings remains underexplored by
both courts and scholars. Incompetent individuals have traditionally
benefited from a spectrum of procedural due process protections in civil
1
cases but generally have no substantive right to competence. This
dichotomous approach to competency in criminal and civil cases has led
courts to downplay the real challenges posed by incompetency in highstakes civil cases. “Quasi-criminal” cases, those that are technically civil
but that can result in severe penalties akin to or even exceeding criminal
punishment, present the toughest questions regarding the types of
2
protections that mentally incompetent individuals should receive.
Removal proceedings represent one type of “quasi-criminal” case, as
3
deportation is a “particularly severe penalty” that may result in the “loss
4
of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living.”
1. See, e.g., Nee Hao Wong v. Immigration & Nationalization Serv., 550 F.2d 521, 522 (9th Cir.
1977) (holding that due process does not require deportation proceedings to be postponed until a
noncitizen is competent to participate intelligently in the proceedings); Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d
1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that “aliens are entitled only to procedural due process, which
provides the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” and that
“contrary to the substantive due process protection from trial and conviction to which a mentally
incompetent criminal defendant is entitled . . . removal proceedings may go forward against
incompetent aliens” (emphasis added)); Mohamed v. TeBrake, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1045 (D. Minn.
2005) (finding, without explanation, that “[t]he substantive competency principle has no corollary in
immigration proceedings”).
2. See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1795, 1797–98 (1992) (arguing that “the bifurcation of legal sanctions into
two categories is misleading,” as “punitive civil sanctions are rapidly expanding,” which raises “serious
doubt . . . about whether conventional civil procedure is suited for an unconventional civil law”); Carol
S. Steiker, Foreward: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 771, 774–77
(1998) (explaining how the state sometimes acts as “preventer of crime and disorder,” rather than
“punisher,” through institutions such as the civil commitment process, and discussing the
constitutional or policy limits that might apply to such “preventive” practices).
3. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); see also Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 1103, 1117 (2013) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365–66); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)
(“Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the
individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That
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Important strides are currently being made toward increasing the
procedural due process protections for immigration detainees with
serious mental disabilities, such as providing them competency hearings
5
and appointed counsel. Yet even these watershed changes do not go far
6
enough. Because a mentally incompetent individual cannot assist counsel,
simply providing a representative fails to resolve troubling questions
regarding the accuracy and reliability of the proceedings. Someone who
does not know or cannot communicate where she was born, how she
arrived in the United States, or how long she has lived here, much less
her family’s history, might derive little benefit from having an attorney.
The attorney would need such basic information to determine if the
person is actually deportable and assess her eligibility for relief from
removal. To complicate matters, an incompetent client may even give the
attorney wrong information, which could cloud the attorney’s entire
analysis. In numerous cases, U.S. citizens with serious mental disabilities
have been wrongfully detained and deported, often based on their own
7
inaccurate statements about their birthplace and nationality.
One of the worst situations is where a noncitizen faces a real risk of
persecution or torture in her country of origin, but her mental disabilities
prevent her from being able to provide the type of consistent and credible
testimony that is necessary to obtain asylum. A lawyer can certainly help
prepare the case but stands largely powerless when it comes to a client’s
inability to testify coherently. In this scenario, the client’s disabilities
clearly render the proceeding unreliable, yet a deportation order could
deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.”); Peter L. Markowitz,
Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of
Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 289, 290–91 (2008) (arguing that only
civil due process protections should apply to the determination of whether to exclude a noncitizen
from entering the United States, but the full panoply of constitutional protections afforded to criminal
defendants should apply to the determination of whether to deport a lawful permanent resident). See
generally Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1299 (2011) (examining
the trajectory of Supreme Court cases regarding the quasi-criminal nature of deportation
proceedings).
5. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Office of Immigration Review, Department of
Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented
Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2013/SafeguardsUnrepresentedImmigrationDetainees.html.
6. This Article uses the term “mental disabilities” to include mental illnesses as well as cognitive or
developmental delays, because both types of disabilities may lead individuals to be legally incompetent.
7. In 2007, for example, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) wrongfully
deported Pedro Guzman, a U.S. citizen with development disabilities, who was lost in Mexico for
almost three months before being located and returned to California. He allegedly told ICE officers,
Customs and Border Patrol officials, and others that he was born in Mexico. See Paloma Esquivel, Suit
Filed Over Man’s Deportation Ordeal, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 2008, at 4. In 2008, ICE deported a U.S.
citizen named Mark Lyttle, who had bipolar disorder and development disabilities, after he signed a
statement verifying that he was a Mexican national. See Human Rights Watch, Deportation by
Default: Mental Disability, Unfair Hearings, and Indefinite Detention in the US Immigration
System 4 (2010) [hereinafter Deportation by Default].
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ensue with potentially life-threatening consequences. Criminal trials do
not proceed if the defendant cannot assist with the defense because we
recognize that any trial would be unfair if the defendant cannot
communicate exonerating information. Yet we expect removal hearings
to proceed even if the respondent cannot convey crucial information that
could stop her deportation.
This Article argues that the same reasons underlying the prohibition
against trial of incompetent defendants support recognizing a substantive
right to competence in removal proceedings. The rationales for a right to
mental competence in criminal cases include: preserving the accuracy
and reliability of the proceedings; protecting other rights that cannot be
exercised if incompetent, including the right to be present during the
8
proceedings; and safeguarding the dignity of the process. These same
concerns apply in the removal context but removal has also become an
extension of the criminal process, with immigration consequences flowing
9
directly from arrest, investigation, detention, and conviction. The
integrated nature of immigration enforcement and criminal proceedings
underscores the importance of adopting a consistent approach for
questions of mental competence.
Mapping the spectrum of mental competence against the spectrum of
due process protection provides a useful framework for analyzing issues of
competence. On one end of the competence spectrum are individuals
who are not competent to stand trial or face removal, even when
represented by counsel. The Supreme Court defined this standard of
10
11
competence in Dusky v. United States and Drope v. Missouri. Further
along the spectrum are individuals who are competent to stand trial or
face removal but lack the higher level of competence necessary for selfrepresentation. The Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of this
category in Indiana v. Edwards, although it did not define the heightened
12
standard of competence. Finally, some individuals demonstrate the
higher level of competence necessary to represent themselves.

8. See, e.g., Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 457–58 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126, 1143–56 (2013) (describing how the immigration system
functions as part of the criminal system and how immigration enforcement and criminal punishment
involve an “integrated process”).
10. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that the standard for
competence to stand trial “must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”)
11. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“[A] person whose mental condition is such that
he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”).
12. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008) (holding that states may impose a higher
standard of competency for self-representation).
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Each of these groups along the spectrum of competence corresponds
to a different level of due process protection. For the first group, those
who are not competent under Dusky/Drope, due process requires
13
termination of the proceedings, which is analogous to dismissal. For the
middle group of individuals, those who are competent to stand trial but
lack the higher competence necessary for self-representation, attorneys
must be appointed. This would represent a significant change from the
current removal system in which individuals have the privilege of
14
obtaining representation at their own expense. If an attorney could not
be appointed, then the case would have to be terminated. Only members
of the third group, those who demonstrate the heightened competence
required for self-representation, would be allowed to proceed pro se.
Part I of this Article provides relevant background information about
the prevalence of mental disabilities among individuals in removal
proceedings and emphasizes that only a small fraction of these individuals
would qualify as legally incompetent under the Dusky/Drope standard.
Recognizing a right to competence would not, therefore, pose a major
obstacle to immigration enforcement. Part II sets forth the standards for
competency in both criminal and civil proceedings, exploring specifically
how issues of incompetency are handled in two types of quasi-criminal
cases: juvenile adjudications and habeas petitions. This discussion shows
that recognizing a substantive right to competence in a technically civil
proceeding is not unprecedented, as most states have already recognized
15
this right in juvenile delinquency cases. Moreover, the reasoning of
state courts overlaps with the rationale for prohibiting the trial of
incompetent defendants and helps shape the arguments for recognizing a
right to competence in removal proceedings. This same rationale does
not, however, apply to backward-looking habeas proceedings, which bear
none of the trappings of a trial. The Supreme Court’s recent decision
finding no right to competence in capital habeas proceedings therefore
16
poses no obstacle to the arguments proposed in this Article.

13. Termination differs from administrative closure, which simply involves taking the case off the
docket and putting it on hold indefinitely. Requiring immigration judges to terminate cases based on
mental incompetence creates tension with 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2 (2014), which appears to authorize
immigration judges to terminate only in order to allow the respondent to pursue naturalization. One
solution is for the regulation to be amended to authorize judges to terminate in cases of mental
incompetency. Alternatively, courts could apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and construe
the regulation as permitting immigration judges to terminate where the respondent is mentally
incompetent. Courts could also simply find that the regulation conflicts with a constitutional due
process right to competence and is therefore invalid.
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being represented,
at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in
such proceedings.”).
15. See infra notes 110–131 and accompanying text.
16. See Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 700 (2013).
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Part III reviews how immigration courts currently handle issues of
mental competence, explaining that removal proceedings resemble minitrials, much like juvenile adjudications, yet provide minimal protections
for incompetent respondents. Recent developments promise a change in
procedural rights, such as appointment of counsel for mentally
incompetent individuals who are detained, but there has been no
discussion about whether incompetent individuals may be subjected to
17
the removal process and ordered deported in the first place. Reforms
addressing procedural due process rights are important and necessary to
identify which respondents are legally incompetent, but they do not
address the problem of what to do after someone is deemed incompetent.
The recent developments also fail to address appointment of counsel for
non-detained incompetent individuals who lack the heightened
competency necessary for self-representation.
Part IV argues that courts should recognize a substantive right to
competence in removal proceedings, explaining how each of the
arguments underlying the criminal prohibition applies equally to the
removal context. This substantive right would have two tiers, such that a
higher threshold of competence would be required for self-representation.
Part V explores potential concerns with recognizing a right to mental
competence, including the risk of civil commitment and the forfeiture of
a chance to obtain lawful status from the immigration court. While these
are important concerns, this Article offers some reasons why the risks
may actually be lower than they initially appear. Finally, for those who
remain wary of recognizing a right to competence, Part VI discusses
some alternatives, including discretionary termination by immigration
judges, prosecutorial discretion by the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”), and a novel disability rights framework that utilizes a
reasonable accommodation approach for advancing the right to counsel.
Part VI explains why these alternatives may not provide sufficient
protection. This Article concludes that recognizing a substantive right to
competence, or creating an analogous statutory right, would be the best
way to ensure across-the-board protection for mentally incompetent
individuals in removal proceedings.

I. Mental Disabilities Among Individuals Facing Deportation
U.S. immigration law has never been welcoming toward individuals
with mental disabilities. In fact, early immigration laws steadily expanded
the list of mental disabilities that resulted in exclusion. The Immigration

17. In April 2013, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) announced a brand new policy that promises competency hearings and appointed
representatives to detained noncitizens with serious mental disabilities. See Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, supra note 5.
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Act of 1891, for example, excluded “[a]ll idiots” and “insane persons.”
In 1907, the list included: “idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons,
19
epileptics, [and] insane persons.” By 1917, the United States excluded
“[a]ll idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons;
persons who have had one or more attacks of insanity at any time
previously; persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority” and any
20
other persons found to be “mentally . . . defective.” Today, the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) excludes individuals with a
21
mental disorder only if they pose a danger to themselves or others. But
tens of thousands of noncitizens with mental disabilities still face
22
deportation each year. Some of these individuals suffer from cognitive
delays or traumatic brain injuries, while others have serious psychiatric
disorders, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or posttraumatic stress
disorder. They often must navigate the complex removal process alone,
while detained, without access to proper medical or mental healthcare, and
without the assistance of counsel. Some actively experience hallucinations
while in court; others do not know the current date, their place of birth, or
23
cannot grasp the concept of a judge, much less the notion of deportation.
Only limited quantitative information is available regarding
24
noncitizens with mental disabilities in removal proceedings. In 2008, the
Department of Immigrant Health Services reported that 2–5% of
immigration detainees suffer from “a serious and persistent mental illness”
and 10–16% of detainees had experienced “some form of encounter with a
25
mental health professional or the mental health system.” In confidential
memoranda, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
estimated that approximately 15% of the detained immigration

18. Immigration Act of 1891 § 1, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (excluding, among others, “[a]ll idiots,
insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, [and] persons suffering from a
loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease”).
19. Immigration Act of 1907, § 2, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898.
20. Immigration Act of 1917 § 3, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) (2013) (excluding individuals with mental disorders if they
demonstrate “behavior associated with the disorder that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the
property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others,” or if they have a history of such behavior that is
likely to recur or lead to other harmful behavior).
22. See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
23. See Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 6, 25–26.
24. Neither ICE, which is part of DHS, nor the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”), which is an agency within the Department of Justice that includes the immigration courts
and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), tracks these numbers. Attempts by Human Rights
Watch to obtain this data through the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests have also
proved inconclusive. See Deportation by Default, supra note 7.
25. Selected Responses from ICE to Questions Posed by The Washington Post Regarding the
Provision of Mental Health Care to Immigration Detainees, Wash. Post (May 2008),
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/immigration/documents/
day3_ice_mentalhealth.gif. The percentages indicate that around 7500 to 19,000 individuals detained in
2008 had a serious mental illness, and around 38,000 to 60,000 had a mental health encounter.
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26

population includes noncitizens with a mental illness. This is a significant
number of people, given that over 400,000 individuals pass through ICE
27
detention each year. Consistent with the 15% figure, ICE performed
28
57,982 mental health interventions in 2011. These numbers suggest that
up to 60,000 detained individuals with some type of mental illness face
29
deportation each year. Many non-detained individuals in removal
proceedings also have mental disabilities, although the rates are usually
much lower among the general population compared to the incarcerated
30
population. About one in seventeen adults (6%) lives with a serious
mental illness such as schizophrenia, major depression, or bipolar
31
disorder.
Of course, the mere existence of a mental disability does not render
32
someone legally incompetent. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
mental illness “is not a unitary concept” but one that “varies in degree
[and] can vary over time . . . interfer[ing] with an individual’s functioning
33
at different times and in different ways.” Only the most extreme cases
34
tend to result in findings of legal incompetence to stand trial. In the
criminal context, 20–30% of defendants referred for competency
35
evaluations are found to be incompetent. While only a fraction of the

26. Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, Suicides Point to Gaps in Treatment: Errors in Psychiatric
Diagnoses and Drugs Plague Strained Immigration System, Wash. Post, May 13, 2008, at A1.
27. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ERO Facts and Statistics (Dec. 12, 2011),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/reports/ero-facts-and-statistics.pdf.
28. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: ERO—Detainee Health Care—
FY 2011, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/dhc-fy11.pdf.
29. Cf. Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 17 (estimating that the number of persons
appearing in immigration proceedings who have mental disabilities is at least fifteen percent of the
daily or annual total).
30. The National Alliance on Mental Illness reports that twenty-four percent of state prisoners
and twenty-one percent of local jail prisoners have a recent history of a mental health disorder.
According to one report, there are now three times as many people with serious mental illnesses in
jails than in hospitals. See E. Fuller Torrey et al., Treatment Advocacy Ctr., More Mentally Ill
People are in Jails and Prisons Than Hospitals: A Survey of the States at II(b) (May 2010).
31. Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, Mental Illness: Facts and Numbers (2013).
32. See, e.g., Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 443, 445 (10th Cir. 1970) (“The presence of some
degree of mental disorder in the defendant does not necessarily mean that he is incompetent to . . .
assist in his own defense.”).
33. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 165 (2008).
34. Individuals with diagnosed psychotic disorders and histories of past psychiatric
hospitalizations are particularly likely to be found incompetent. A meta-analysis of sixty-eight studies
published between 1968 and 2008 that compared competent and incompetent criminal defendants
using a number of variables found that those diagnosed with a psychotic disorder were eight times more
likely to be found incompetent than defendants without this diagnosis, and that defendants with a
previous psychiatric hospitalization were twice as likely to be found incompetent as defendants who had
not been hospitalized. See Gianni Pirelli, William H. Gottdiener & Patricia A. Zapf, A Meta-Analytic
Review of Competency to Stand Trial Research, 17 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 1, 7, 16–17 (2011).
35. See Pirelli et al., supra note 34, at 3 (suggesting a figure of around 20%, although the rates
vary across jurisdictions); Gary Melton et al., Psychological Evaluations for the Courts: A
Handbook for Mental Health Professionals and Lawyers 141 (3d ed. 2007) (indicating a figure of
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respondents in removal proceedings are therefore likely to qualify as
legally incompetent, it is shocking that DHS requested competency
36
evaluations in just 429 cases between 2004 and 2010. This number
indicates that the government has largely ignored questions of mental
competency in the removal context. Given that over 300,000 people are
37
placed in removal proceedings each year, one would expect a much
higher number of referrals for competency evaluations.
When serious mental disabilities are ignored, the consequences can
be devastating. Recent investigations into deaths in immigration detention
38
centers revealed significant numbers of suicides. These suicides could be
related to ICE’s failure to provide detainees with appropriate mental
39
healthcare. After the suicides came to light, ICE’s Office of Detention
Oversight began paying closer attention to compliance with various
standards. In 2011 and 2012, this office inspected detention facilities
throughout the United States and found numerous deficiencies that
impact the care of detainees with serious mental illnesses, ranging from
failure to place medical grievances in files to involuntary administration
40
of medical treatment. The widespread mistreatment of mentally ill

around 30%); Ronald Roesch & Stephen Golding, Competency to Stand Trial 48–49 (1980)
(reporting a figure of 30% on average); cf. Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in
Preadjudicatory Juveniles and Adults, 26 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 89, 94–95 (1998) (finding, in a
sample of 112 juveniles referred for competency evaluations, that 15% were found incompetent).
36. See Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 12.
37. Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FY 2012 Statistical Year
Book, at C3, tbl. 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf.
38. See Nina Bernstein, Officials Say Detainee Fatalities Were Missed, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2009,
at A10; see also U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, List of Deaths in ICE Custody:
October 2003–December 6, 2012 (showing 131 deaths total and suggesting that about nineteen deaths
were suicides out of 119 for which the cause of death was confirmed).
39. ICE has kept track of how much money it has “saved” by denying treatment for various
mental illnesses. For example, between 2005 and 2006, ICE reported that it saved $43,158 by denying
treatment for depressive disorder, $18,145 by denying treatment for manic-depressive disorder,
$11,688 by denying treatment for unspecified psychosis, $7402 by denying treatment for paranoid
schizophrenia, $6402 by denying treatment for unspecified affective disorders, and $5920 by denying
treatment for prolonged posttraumatic stress disorder. Internal Document from Division of
Immigration Health Services: TAR Cost Savings Based on Denials, Wash. Post (2008),
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/immigration/day2_tardocs.pdf.
ICE
also
“saved” hundreds of thousands of dollars by denying treatment for a host of other conditions that may
be psychosomatic in nature, such as the $91,926 saved by denying treatment for “unspecified chest
pain” and over $55,000 saved by denying treatment for various types of abdominal pain. Id.
40. The deficiencies included: inadequate staffing to address the health needs of detainees; failure
to provide a health exam within fourteen days of the detainee’s arrival at the facility; failure to meet
healthcare needs in a timely manner; failure to treat chronic conditions properly; failure to place
medical grievances in a detainee’s file; inadequate procedures to ensure that slips requesting medical
care reach the proper officials; failure to follow procedures in distributing medication; involuntary
administration of medical treatment (including involuntarily administration of psychotropic
medications); and failure to provide regularly scheduled “sick calls.” See Office of Detention
Oversight, Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Atlanta Field Office:
York County Detention Center York, South Carolina (2013); Office of Detention Oversight,
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detainees makes it even more urgent to consider whether these
individuals should be subject to deportation in the first place.

II. Mental Competence in Criminal and Civil Proceedings
A. Competence in Criminal Proceedings
Dating back to the seventeenth century, authorities in English
common law maintained that an incompetent defendant could not
41
undergo a criminal trial, receive judgment, or be executed. These
authorities explicitly tied the requirement of competence to the
defendant’s capacity to communicate exonerating information to others.
For example, Sir John Hawles observed that “a lunatick . . . is by an act
of God . . . disabled to make his just defence,” as there “may be
circumstances lying in his private knowledge, which would prove his
innocency, of which he can have no advantage, because not known to the
42
persons who shall take upon them his defence.” William Blackstone

Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Newark Field Office: Elizabeth
Contract Detention Facility Newark, New Jersey (2012); Office of Detention Oversight,
Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Philadelphia Field Office: Clinton
County Correctional Facility McElhattan, Pennsylvania (2012); Office of Detention Oversight,
Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Saint Paul Field Office: Ramsey
County Adult Detention Center Saint Paul, Minnesota (2012); Office of Detention Oversight,
Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations San Francisco Field Office:
Sacramento County Jail Sacramento, California (2012); Office of Detention Oversight,
Compliance Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Newark Field Office: Essex County
Correctional Facility Newark, New Jersey (2012); Office of Detention Oversight, Compliance
Inspection: Enforcement and Removal Operations Miami Field Office: Broward Transition Center
Pompano Beach, Florida (2012); Office of Detention Oversight, Compliance Inspection:
Enforcement and Removal Operations Chicago Field Office: Jefferson County Justice Center
Mount Vernon, Illinois (2012); Office of Detention Oversight, Compliance Inspection:
Enforcement and Removal Operations New York Field Office: Hudson County Correctional
Facility Kearny, New Jersey (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/foia/library.
41. See, e.g., 1 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 35 (Prof’l Books
Ltd. 1971) (1736) (“[I]f [a] person after his plea, and before his trial, become of non sane memory, he
shall not be tried; or, if after his trial he become of non sane memory, he shall not receive judgment;
or, if after judgment he become of non sane memory, his execution shall be spared; for were he of
sound memory, he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution.”); see also Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (“The rule that a criminal defendant who is incompetent should
not be required to stand trial has deep roots in our common-law heritage.”); Youtsey v. United States,
97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899) (collecting common law authorities discussing the prohibition against the
trial of incompetent defendants).
42. Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman (1719), reprinted in 11 State
Trials 473, 476 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816) (“[N]othing is more certain law, than that a person who falls
mad after a crime supposed to be committed, shall not be tried for it; and if he falls mad after judgment he
shall not be executed. . . . [T]he true reason of the law I think to be this, a person of ‘non sana memoria,’
and a lunatick during his lunacy, is by an act of God . . . disabled to make his just defence. There may be
circumstances lying in his private knowledge, which would prove his innocency, of which he can have no
advantage, because not known to the persons who shall take upon them his defence.”).
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likewise questioned how a person who is “mad” can “make his defence”
and receive a fair trial when “the law knows not but he might have
44
offered some reason, if in his senses, to have stayed [the] proceeding.”
Trials were therefore postponed until a date when the defendant “by
collecting together his intellects, and having them entire, . . . shall be able
45
to model his defense and to ward off the punishment of the law.”
By the nineteenth century, U.S. courts had also addressed the issue
of competence to stand trial. In 1899, the Sixth Circuit explained in
Youtsey v. United States that “[i]t is not ‘due process of law’ to subject an
46
insane person to trial upon an indictment involving liberty or life.” In
that case, “the defendant’s mind and memory, as a consequence of
epileptic attacks, had become so impaired as that he was unable to advise
his counsel as to his defense, or recall transactions which ought to have
been within his knowledge,” and “he was unable, in consequence of his
47
impaired mind and memory, to testify for himself.” The court remanded
the case for “a thorough investigation of the sanity of the accused,”
explaining that “the learned trial judge should have adopted some
method of satisfying himself that the accused was able to rationally
48
defend himself, before putting him on trial under the plea of not guilty.”
Several rationales underlie the longstanding existence of the
prohibition against the trial of incompetent defendants. Explicitly
examining this rationale is helpful in considering whether a similar
prohibition should apply in quasi-criminal contexts. First and foremost, the
49
prohibition helps protect the accuracy and reliability of the proceedings.
An incompetent defendant may not understand what information is

43. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *24–25 (1769) (“[I]f a man in his sound memory
commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be
arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if,
after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his
defence? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not
be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for
peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might
have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.”).
44. See id. at *389; see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 n.11 (1993) (“[T]he prohibition
against the trial of incompetent defendants dates back at least to the time of Blackstone.”).
45. Frith’s Case, 22 How. State Trials 307 (1790).
46. Youtsey, 97 F. 937, at 941.
47. Id. at 942.
48. See id. at 947; see also United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 289 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906) (“Does
the mental impairment of the prisoner’s mind, if such there be, whatever it is, disable him . . . from
fairly presenting his defense, whatever it may be, and make it unjust to go on with his trial at this time,
or is he feigning to be in that condition . . . ?”).
49. In 1906, a federal circuit court explained that it would be “a reproach to justice and our
institutions, if a human being . . . were compelled to go to trial at a time when he is not sufficiently in
possession of his mental faculties to enable him to make a rational and proper defense.” Chisolm,
149 F. at 288. In other words, the competency rule is one of “the great safeguards which the law adopts
in the punishment of crime and the upholding of justice.” Id.
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relevant to prove her innocence or may be unable to share that
information with the court, which could contribute to an erroneous
50
conviction. Second, the prohibition helps protect other constitutional
rights, “including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to
summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to
testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing
51
so.” An incompetent defendant’s inability to meaningfully exercise
52
these rights can also contribute to problems with accuracy. For
example, an incompetent defendant may not be able to identify lies told
by adversarial witnesses, whereas a competent defendant could point
53
these out to her attorney, which would assist with cross-examination.
Third, the prohibition against subjecting an incompetent defendant
54
to trial is closely related to the prohibition against in absentia trials.
Defendants have the right to be present at all stages of the criminal
process. This right derives primarily from the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause, but also from the Fifth Amendment Due Process
55
Clause. A mentally incompetent person is deprived of this right because
she “may be as far removed from the proceedings as if physically
56
absent.” Finally, the prohibition against trying incompetent individuals
helps preserve the “moral dignity” of the defendant and the criminal
process. If a defendant behaves “insane” in court, the legal process may
57
appear undignified and unfair. Some scholars have also argued that

50. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
51. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139–
40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). In rejecting Oklahoma’s clear and convincing evidence standard
for proving incompetence, the Court emphasized that “the consequences of an erroneous
determination of competence are dire,” as a defendant who “lacks the ability to communicate
effectively with counsel, he may be unable to exercise other ‘rights deemed essential to a fair trial.’”
Id. at 364.
52. See Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.1(a) (2d ed. 2003).
53. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 750 (1987) (Marhsall, J., joined by Brennan, J. and
Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the presence of the defendant “enhances the reliability of the
factfinding process,” as it is often the defendant, not counsel, who “possesses the knowledge needed to
expose inaccuracies in the witness’ answers,” and “[h]aving the defendant present ensures that these
inaccuracies are called to the judge’s attention immediately.”).
54. The Supreme Court has noted that “[s]ome have viewed the common-law prohibition [against
the trial of incompetent individuals] ‘as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally
incompetent defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no
opportunity to defend himself.’” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (quoting Caleb Foote, A
Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 832, 834 (1960)).
55. See U.S. Const. amend. V, VI; see also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985)
(“The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment . . . but we have recognized that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause in
some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.”).
56. See Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (4th Cir. 1963); see also Mohamed v. Gonzales,
477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A mentally incompetent person, although physically present, is
absent from the hearing for all practical purposes.”).
57. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008).
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dignity requires the defendant to have “a meaningful moral understanding
58
of wrongdoing and punishment.” Various theories of punishment are
premised on an understanding of wrongdoing, so the absence of such an
59
understanding undermines the purpose of prosecution.
The prohibition against the trial of an incompetent defendant has
60
both procedural and substantive due process components. Procedural
due process, which involves the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the
defendant’s competence, requires a competency hearing whenever the
61
evidence raises a “bona fide doubt” as to a defendant’s competence.
While there are “no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate
the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed,” the range
of relevant factors that may be sufficient to trigger a competency hearing
include “a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any
62
prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.” Indeed, “even one
63
of these facts, standing alone, may be sufficient.” A mental health

58. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope,
47 U. Miami L. Rev. 539, 543 (1993); see also Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 8, at 458
(connecting the prohibition to “the philosophy of punishment that the defendant know why he is being
punished”).
59. The Supreme Court’s decisions to categorically exclude mentally retarded individuals and
juveniles from the death penalty invoked similar reasoning based on penological purposes. See Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–21 (2002) (finding that imposition of the death penalty on a mentally
retarded person does not serve the penological purposes of retribution and deterrence); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005) (“Once juveniles’ diminished culpability is recognized, it is evident
that neither of the two penological justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence of
capital crimes by prospective offenders . . . provides adequate justification for imposing that penalty on
juveniles.”). The ability to distinguish right from wrong is part of the test for “insanity” as a defense,
which provides a basis for mitigating punishment, but it is not part of the test for competence, which
determines whether prosecution may occur at all. Cf. Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep.
718 (H.L.) 719, 722–23 (setting forth the standard for being found “insane” at the time of the offense);
cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (setting forth the standard for competence to stand
trial). In Atkins, the Supreme Court recognized that the “diminished capacities” of mentally retarded
individuals justify exemption from the death penalty even if they are able to tell right from wrong
under the M’Naghten standard. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
60. Cf. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curium) (establishing the right not to be
subjected to trial if incompetent); cf. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1966) (recognizing a
procedural right to a competency hearing in state prosecutions based on the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Walker v. Att’y Gen., 167 F.3d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“[C]ompetency claims can raise issues of both substantive and procedural due process.”).
61. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385–86 (“Where the evidence raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to a
defendant’s competence to stand trial, the judge on his own motion must impanel a jury and conduct a
sanity hearing pursuant to [the Illinois competency statute at issue].”); see also Porter v. McKaskle,
466 U.S. 984, 985–86 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is settled that, if evidence available to a trial
judge raises a bona fide doubt regarding a defendant’s ability to understand and participate in the
proceedings against him, the judge has an obligation to order an examination to assess his competency,
even if the defendant does not request such an exam.”).
62. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180.
63. Id. Federal appeals courts have reversed lower courts for failing to conduct competency
hearings in various situations, such as where: (1) the defendant could not communicate intelligently,
had sustained a serious head injury, and had a family history of mental disturbance; (2) the defendant
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evaluation is normally ordered by the court before a hearing on
competence to stand trial. Each state has a mechanism for criminal courts
64
to obtain a competency evaluation for a defendant. The defendant has
65
the burden of proving incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Once a defendant is found to be incompetent, substantive due process
66
requires freedom from criminal prosecution.
The Supreme Court defined the standard for competence to stand
67
trial decades ago. Much more recently, the Court recognized that a
higher standard of competence may be required for self-representation.
These two standards are discussed separately below since both are highly
relevant to the removal context, followed by an explanation of the
consequences of an incompetence finding.
1. Competence to Stand Trial
In 1960, the Supreme Court issued its seminal decision in Dusky v.
United States, which held that the standard for competence to stand trial
“must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
68
proceedings against him.” In Drope v. Missouri, the Supreme Court
expounded on this standard, stating that “a person whose mental condition
is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of
the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in
69
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.” Drope built on
Dusky by specifically mentioning the ability to assist in preparation of the
70
defense. These cases remain the guideposts for evaluating competency to
stand trial. Scholars such as Richard Bonnie have expounded on the
Court’s terse competence standard by identifying in more detail the
abilities needed to assist counsel, such as the ability to appreciate the
seriousness of the situation and “recognize and relate relevant information
displayed strange, self-defeating behavior in court and believed his lawyer and the judge were part of a
conspiracy; and (3) the defendant had been hospitalized for multiple mental disorders, had likely
undergone treatment with antipsychotic medication, and his attorney had repeatedly requested assistance
from mental health professionals. See, e.g., United States v. Nichelson, 550 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1977);
Torres v. Prunty, 233 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000); Cowley v. Stricklin, 929 F.2d 640 (11th Cir. 1991).
64. William H. Fisher et al., From Case Management To Court Clinic: Examining Forensic System
Involvement of Persons With Severe Mental Illness, 2 Mental Health Services Res. 41 (2000).
65. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 361 (1996) (rejecting Oklahoma’s “clear and convincing”
standard for establishing incompetency as offensive to “a principle of justice that is deeply ‘rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people’”).
66. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960) (per curiam).
67. Id.; Drope, 420 U.S. at 171.
68. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171.
70. Requiring competence to assist counsel protects both the dignity of the process and the
reliability of the adjudication. See Bonnie, supra note 58, at 554–55.
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71

to the attorney.” Bonnie and others have also emphasized the
defendant’s decisionmaking capacity, focusing on the “capacity for
72
reasoned choices.”
2. Heightened Competence for Self-Representation
Separate from the issue of competence to stand trial is the question
of what level of competence a defendant must have to conduct her own
73
defense. The Supreme Court only recently addressed this issue in
74
Indiana v. Edwards. After the trial court found Edwards competent to
stand trial but incompetent to represent himself, Edwards argued on
75
appeal that his right to self-representation had been violated. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that “the Constitution
permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those
competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from
severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to
76
conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” In reaching the conclusion
that states may create a heightened standard of competency for selfrepresentation, the Court emphasized both the accuracy of the
77
adjudication and the importance of safeguarding dignity. The Court
recognized that the lack of mental capacity “threatens an improper
71. Id. at 562–63.
72. See id. at 579; see also Terry A. Moroney, Emotional Competence, “Rational Understanding,”
and the Criminal Defendant, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1375, 1376 (2006) (“A robust conception of
adjudicative competence that gives meaning to the Dusky standard must ask whether a criminal
defendant has the capacity to participate meaningfully in the host of decisions potentially required of
her, and a sound assessment of such capacity requires careful attention to both the cognitive and
emotional influences on rational decision-making.”); see generally Joanmarie Ilaria Dasvoli, Physically
Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. Louisville L. Rev. 313 (2009).
73. This question is particularly relevant when considering the appropriate competency standard
for removal proceedings where counsel is a “privilege” rather than a right; persons in removal
proceedings may hire attorneys at their own expense, but will not be provided attorneys.
Consequently, sixty percent of the respondents in removal proceedings before the immigration courts
are pro se, with significantly higher rates of pro se respondents in certain geographical areas and
among detained populations.
74. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). Long before Edwards, and even before Dusky,
however, the Court addressed the relationship between mental competency and representation by
counsel in Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954), which powerfully stated that “[n]o trial can be
fair that leaves the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his
mental condition stands helpless and alone before the court.”
75. In making this argument, Edwards cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Faretta v. California,
which recognized that a criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to proceed without counsel
when” he “voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975)
(emphasis added). Because the defendant in that case was “literate, competent, and understanding,”
the decision never addressed the impact of mental competency on the right to self-representation. Id.
at 834–35 n.46. Yet Faretta did indicate that the right to self-representation is not absolute, noting that
a pro se defendant had no right “to abuse the dignity of the courtroom” or to “engag[e] in serious and
obstructionist misconduct.” Id.
76. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178.
77. Id. at 176–77.
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conviction or sentence” and therefore “undercuts the most basic of the
78
Constitution’s criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial.” In
addition, the Court expressed concern about the humiliating “spectacle
79
that could well result from [a defendant’s] self-representation at trial,”
stressing that the “proceedings must not only be fair, they must appear
80
fair to all who observe them.”
While Edwards stopped short of defining the heightened standard of
competence, it did mention some conditions that could obstruct selfrepresentation, such as “[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining
attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and
81
other common symptoms of severe mental illness.” Some scholars have
criticized Edwards for its vagueness and deference to judicial discretion,
while others have attempted to identify the abilities necessary for self82
representation more concretely. Despite its shortcomings, Edwards
remains highly relevant to considering the appropriate competence
standard for removal proceedings where counsel is a privilege rather
than a right. Persons in removal proceedings may hire attorneys at their
83
own expense but are not appointed attorneys by the government.
Consequently, about half of the respondents in removal proceedings are
pro se, with significantly higher rates of pro se respondents in certain
84
geographical areas and among detained populations. Edwards indicates
78. Id.
79. Id. at 176.
80. Id. at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160
(1988)).
81. Id. at 176 (quoting Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, at 26, Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 405546, at *26) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court in Edwards declined to adopt Indiana’s proposed standard, which would
have “den[ied] a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot
communicate coherently with the court or a jury.” Id. at 178 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 20, Edwards,
554 U.S. 164 (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 33606, at *20).
82. For critiques of Edwards, see, e.g., Conor P. Cleary, Note, Flouting Faretta: The Supreme Court’s
Failure to Adopt a Coherent Communication Standard of Competency and the Threat to SelfRepresentation After Indiana v. Edwards, 63 Okla. L. Rev. 145 (2010); Alexander B. Feinberg, Casenote:
Constitutional Law—Competency and Self-representation—Constitution Permits States to Limit a
Defendant’s Self-representation Right by Insisting Upon Representation by Counsel for Defendant Lacking
Mental Competency, 39 Cumb. L. Rev. 567, 579 (2009). For scholarship that proposes standards for
competence to engage in self-representation, see E. Lea Johnston, Representational Competence: Defining
the Limits of the Right to Self-Representation at Trial, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 523, 571 (2011) (drawing on
problem-solving theory to identify the abilities necessary for self-representation).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being represented,
at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in
such proceedings.”).
84. See Office of Planning, Analysis & Tech., Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, FY 2012 Statistical Year Book at G1 (2013) (stating that the percentage of
represented aliens increased from 45% in fiscal year (“FY”) 2008 to 56% in FY 2012); Peter L.
Markowitz et al., Study Group on Immigration Representation, Accessing Justice: The Availability and
Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 357, 364 (2011) (finding that
detainees were represented 40% of the time in New York City, 19% of the time in other parts of New
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that it would be appropriate to require a higher standard of mental
competency for these pro se individuals. As discussed in Part III, the only
published decision on mental competence by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) has the opposite effect of imposing a lower standard of
85
competence for unrepresented respondents.
3. Consequences of a Finding of Incompetence
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Jackson v. Indiana, an
incompetent defendant could be detained indefinitely until competency
was restored. In Jackson, the Court held that an incompetent “defendant
cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to
determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain
86
that competency in the foreseeable future.” Under the current federal
statute, once an incompetent defendant has been committed for four
months, a determination must be made about whether there is a
“substantial probability” that the defendant can be restored to
87
competence. Absent that showing, the state must either initiate civil
88
commitment proceedings or release the defendant. In some situations,
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication is allowed to help
89
restore competence. As a practical matter, Jackson has led to more
“marginally competent” defendants being declared restored and pushed
90
into the courtroom. The increase in “marginally competent” defendants
underscores the importance of recognizing a higher standard of
competence for self-representation. In the criminal context, where most
defendants are represented, this may not be a pressing concern, but in

York, and 22% of the time in Newark, New Jersey); see generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration,
122 Yale L.J. 2282 (2013) (exploring how a future immigration defense system should be designed).
85. The BIA does not require unrepresented individuals to have the ability to assist counsel with
their defense, dropping a key part of the Dusky/Drope standard. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474,
479 (B.I.A. 2011) (finding the proper test for competence in removal proceedings to be whether the
respondent “has a rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings, can
consult with the attorney or representative if there is one, and has a reasonable opportunity to examine
and present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.” (emphasis added)).
86. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2012).
88. Id. § 4246.
89. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990);
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution permits
the Government to involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
serious criminal charges to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is
medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of
the trial and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is significantly necessary to further important
governmental trial-related interests.” Id. at 179.
90. J. Amy Dillard, Madness Alone Punishes the Madman: The Search for Moral Dignity in the
Court’s Competency Doctrine As Applied in Capital Cases, 79 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 482–84 (2012)
(arguing that courts and hospitals pushed more marginally competent defendants into court in
response to Jackson).
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the removal context, it becomes urgent to address the situation of
marginally competent, unrepresented individuals.
B. Competence in Civil Proceedings
The Supreme Court has never recognized a substantive due process
right to competence in civil proceedings, but courts must still provide
procedural due process, which guarantees “the opportunity to be heard at
91
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” The precise contours of
procedural due process depend on the particular circumstances of the
case and require consideration of the three factors set forth by the
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge: “(1) the nature of the private
interest that will be affected, (2) the comparative risk of an erroneous
deprivation of that interest with and without additional or substitute
procedural safeguards, and (3) the nature and magnitude of any
countervailing interest in not providing additional or substitute procedural
92
requirements.” Where the “individual interests at stake . . . are both
‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money,’”
93
due process places a heightened burden of proof on the government.
Courts applying the Mathews test in different contexts have, not
surprisingly, reached different conclusions about the procedures that
should be provided to deal with questions regarding a litigant’s
competency.
The flexible, fact-specific balancing test in Mathews is consistent with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), which gives judges broad discretion
to decide how to protect the rights of an incompetent individual in civil

91. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517–18 (2011) (applying the Mathews factors in the context
of determining whether a civil contempt proceeding requires appointment of counsel) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The Mathews balancing test was initially
conceived to address due process claims in the context of administrative law in a case involving a
challenge to the adequacy of procedures for terminating Social Security disability benefits. Mathews,
424 U.S. at 323–26. Mathews has since become a general approach for testing whether certain
procedures comply with due process in a variety of contexts. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,
444 (1992). For example, the Supreme Court has applied the Mathews to determine the standard of
proof for termination of parental rights and for civil commitment to a mental hospital. See generally
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
The U.S. Courts of Appeals have also applied the Mathews test to competency issues arising in the
removal context. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing the Mathews
test in assessing whether a petitioner challenging her deportability had a right to a competency hearing).
93. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756 (citation omitted) (involving termination of parental
rights); Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 (concerning involuntary civil commitment); Woodby v. INS,
385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966) (involving deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960)
(concerning denaturalization); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (concerning
denaturalization); Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 157 n.23 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e cannot treat
immigration proceedings like everyday civil proceedings . . . because . . . the liberty of an individual is
at stake in deportation proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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proceedings. This rule provides for the appointment of a guardian ad
litem or issuance of another appropriate order “to protect . . . [an]
94
incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.’” Both the
Mathews test and Rule 17(c) implicitly recognize that the interests at
stake in a civil proceeding may vary over a significant range. At one end
of the spectrum, in the most ordinary type of case, mere money is in
dispute. Other civil proceedings may threaten more basic human needs,
such as eviction from housing or denial of public benefits. Then there are
civil proceedings with outcomes that encroach upon punishment, such as
termination of parental rights, civil commitment, incarceration for civil
contempt, juvenile delinquency adjudications, habeas proceedings, and
removal proceedings. Commentators have long discussed the erosion of
the civil-criminal distinction and raised questions about what
95
constitutional protections should apply in punitive civil cases. Quasicriminal proceedings raise particularly challenging questions about what
procedures should be followed to assess competency and what to do if a
party is found incompetent.

94. Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)) (holding
that “if an incompetent person is unrepresented, the court should not enter a judgment which operates
as a judgment on the merits without complying with Rule 17(c)”). In Krain, the court explained that
when there is a substantial question about the mental competence of a party proceeding pro se, the
court should conduct a hearing to determine competence and, if necessary, to appoint a guardian ad
litem. Id. The Second Circuit has held that Rule 17(c) imposes no duty upon a district court to “inquire
sua sponte into a pro se [litigant’s] mental competence, even when the judge observes behavior that
may suggest mental incapacity.” Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1195 (2004). However, a district court would likely abuse its discretion if it
failed to consider Rule 17(c) when “presented with evidence from an appropriate court of record or a
relevant public agency indicating that the party had been adjudicated incompetent, or if the court
received verifiable evidence from a mental health professional demonstrating that the party is being or
has been treated for mental illness of the type that would render him or her legally incompetent.” Id.
While the court was “mindful of the need to protect the rights of the mentally incompetent,” it also
expressed concern about “the volume of pro se filings” and the “potential burden on court
administration associated with conducting frequent inquiries into pro se litigants’ mental competency.”
See id.; see also Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2012) (approving of the Ferrelli standard).
95. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 2, at 1797; John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the
Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875 (1991);
Franklin E. Zimring, Multiple Middlegrounds Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1901
(1991); Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 Va. L. Rev. 79
(2008) (examining procedural protections in criminal prosecutions and high-stakes civil cases against
large corporations); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate
Sanction, 94 Cornell L Rev. 239, 241–42 (2009); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure:
Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 Geo. L.J. 775, 778–89 (1997); Mary
M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J. 1325 (1991)
(recommending greater procedural protections for punitive civil sanctions); Jonathan I. Charney, The
Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 478
(1974); J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379 (1976).
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Given the complexity of these issues, it is not surprising that courts
frequently disagree about what process is due even when considering the
same type of high stakes case. For example, in termination of parental
96
rights cases, which threaten a “unique kind of deprivation” and bear
97
“many of the indicia of a criminal trial,” state courts are split about
whether the Mathews test requires a competency hearing prior to
terminating the parent’s rights, which the Supreme Court has described
98
as “a penalty as great, if not greater, than a criminal penalty.” The
Connecticut Supreme Court has held that due process requires a
99
competency hearing in this situation. Yet courts in several other states
have reached the opposite conclusion after weighing the Mathews
100
factors.
Similarly, state courts are split about whether due process requires a
competency hearing during civil commitment proceedings for sexually
101
violent predators. Applying the Mathews test, the California and

96. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127–28 (1996) (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham
Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
97. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762.
98. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 n.5.
99. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that due process requires a competency hearing prior to
termination of parental rights “when (1) the parent’s attorney requests such a hearing, or (2) in the
absence of such a request, the conduct of the parent reasonably suggests to the court, in the exercise of
its discretion, the desirability of ordering such a hearing sua sponte.” In re Alexander V., 613 A.2d 780,
785 (Conn. 1992). The standard in both situations is “whether the record before the court contains
specific factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence of mental impairment.”
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see In re Kaleb H., 48 A.3d 631, 636–39
(Conn. 2012) (applying the standard in In re Alexander V. and holding that a competency hearing was
not required because the record did not contain specific factors that, if true, would constitute
substantial evidence of a mental impairment that would impede the respondent’s ability to understand
the proceedings against her and assist counsel in her defense).
100. See, e.g., In re R.M.T., 352 S.W.3d 12, 19–22 (Tex. App. 2011) (discussing each of the three
factors in the Mathews test, emphasizing the best interests of the child as a “trump card,” and
concluding that due process did not require a competency hearing prior to terminating parental
rights); In re N.S.E., 666 S.E.2d 587, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“We find no authority, and the father
has cited none, requiring a Georgia court to order a competency hearing in a termination
proceeding.”); In re W.J.S.M., 231 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (“To require that a parent
must be ‘competent’ before a court could terminate their parental rights ignores the rights of the child
to permanency. The basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights was substantially based on the fact
that Mother suffers from a mental condition which is permanent and renders her unable to provide the
child with the necessary care, custody and control.”); People v. Wanda (In re Charles A.), 856 N.E.2d
569, 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (applying the Mathews factors and reasoning that termination of parental
rights cases must be resolved expeditiously because postponing the case for a fitness hearing or for
restoration of competency would adversely impact a child’s interest in finding a permanent home, as
well as impose an increased fiscal cost and administrative burden on the state).
101. Compare Moore v. Superior Court, 237 P.3d 530, 547 (Cal. 2010) (“[W]e conclude that due
process does not require mental competence on the part of someone undergoing a commitment or
recommitment trial under the [SVP Act].”), and Commonwealth v. Nieves, 846 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Mass.
2006) (“We see no reason why the public interest in committing sexually dangerous persons to the care
of the treatment center must be thwarted by the fact that one who is sexually dangerous also happens
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Massachusetts Supreme Courts found no due process right to a
102
competency determination in such proceedings. These courts gave
substantial weight to the government’s interest in public safety and
reasoned that the right to appointed counsel in this type of proceeding is
103
sufficient to protect the respondent’s interest. A Florida appellate court,
on the other hand, found that the person must be competent in order to
exercise her due process right to challenge the factual assertions contained
104
in documents, including expert opinions. Otherwise, the court reasoned,
“the due process right is simply illusory,” because “it is an incompetent
respondent’s inability to assist counsel in challenging the facts contained
105
in those hearsay statements that violates due process.” The reasoning
of the Florida court highlights the interdependence of rights, especially
the relationship between competency and the right to counsel, which we
shall see again in the discussion of juvenile adjudications below.
This Subpart examines the rights of incompetent individuals in two
types of quasi-criminal civil proceedings as relevant background for the
discussion of removal proceedings that follows. First, juvenile
adjudications provide a clear example of a civil proceeding where the
right to competence has been widely recognized. Exploring the reasoning
of state courts helps clarify in which other contexts this right should also
apply. Juvenile adjudications are then contrasted with capital habeas
proceedings, which have none of the trappings of a criminal trial and
require far less, if any, participation by the petitioner. These critical
differences in the nature of the two proceedings help explain why the
Supreme Court recently concluded that there is no right to competence
106
in capital habeas proceedings. As will be shown in Part III, removal
proceedings resemble juvenile adjudications, rather than habeas
proceedings.
1. Mental Competence in Juvenile Delinquency Adjudications
Juvenile delinquency adjudications are technically civil but so
closely approximate criminal trials that juveniles benefit from many of
the same rights as criminal defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court has
held, for example, that juveniles are entitled to appointed counsel,
formal notice, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the

to be incompetent.”), with Branch v. State (In re Commitment of Branch), 890 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing a limited right to a competency determination).
102. See Moore, 237 P.3d at 547; Nieves, 846 N.E.2d at 385.
103. See Nieves, 846 N.E.2d at 385; see also John L. Schwab, Due Process and “The Worst of the
Worst”: Mental Competence in Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings, 112 Colum.
L. Rev. 912, 945 (2012).
104. In re Commitment of Branch, 890 So. 2d at 327.
105. Id.
106. Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 700 (2013).
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107

privilege against self-incrimination.
Moreover, each element in a
juvenile adjudication must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt—the
108
same standard used for a criminal conviction. Yet some important
differences remain between juvenile adjudications and criminal trials:
juveniles do not have the right to a trial by jury, the right to bail, or the
109
right to a public trial.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a
juvenile must be competent to be adjudicated, the majority of states have
now addressed this issue. At least thirty-four states and the District of
Columbia have recognized a right to competence in juvenile adjudications,
110
twenty-six of them by statute and nine through case law. Three main
lines of reasoning can be derived from these state court decisions: (1) a
substantive right to competence emerges because no amount of procedure
is sufficient to ensure a fair and accurate proceeding; (2) a right to
competence is a precondition for exercising other established rights; and
(3) juvenile adjudications have many of the trappings of a criminal trial, so
107. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31–57 (1967).
108. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
109. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545–551 (1971) (holding that the right to
jury trial is inapplicable to juvenile proceedings); United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th
Cir. 2000) (“We have not extended the ‘public trial’ right to juvenile defendants. In McKeiver, the
Supreme Court seemed to express disdain for the idea.”); State ex rel. P.M.P., 975 A.2d 441, 446 (N.J.
2009) (“[E]xcept for the right to indictment, the right to a jury trial, and the right to bail, [a]ll rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
this State . . . [are] applicable to cases arising under [the juvenile code]” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
110. Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern Juvenile
Court, 9 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 353, 372, 379 (2001). Among the states that rely on statutes, some have
a single statutory scheme that applies to both juvenile adjudications and criminal trials for adults,
while others have separate statutes that specifically address juvenile competency. See Sue Burrell, et
al., Incompetent Youth in California Juvenile Justice, 19 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 198, 213 (2008). State
courts that have found a constitutional right to competence in juvenile proceedings include Arizona,
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Vermont, Washington, D.C. See In re
Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1979) (finding the right not to be tried or convicted
while incompetent to be a “fundamental right,” even in the context of a juvenile delinquency
adjudicatory proceeding); State ex rel. Causey, 363 So. 2d 472, 476 (La. 1978) (finding a “fundamental
due process right” to competence in juvenile adjudications); In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d 1264, 1267 (D.C.
1990) (“The right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent is a fundamental right of a juvenile in
juvenile delinquency proceedings”); State ex rel. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 619 P.2d 12 (Ariz. 1980)
(en banc); People v. Carey (In re Carey), 615 N.W.2d 742, 746–47 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding
that “the right not to be tried while incompetent is as fundamental in juvenile proceedings as it is in
the criminal context”); In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d 810, 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (“Principles of fundamental
fairness require that this right [not to be subjected to a trial while incompetent] be afforded in juvenile
proceedings.”); People v. T.D.W. (In re T.D.W.), 441 N.E.2d 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), overruled on
other grounds by People v. Gentry, 815 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re Williams, 687 N.E.2d 507,
510 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “‘the right not to be tried while incompetent’ is as fundamental
in juvenile proceedings as it is in criminal trials of adults”); In re J.M., 769 A.2d 656, 662 (Vt. 2001)
(“Although juveniles are not necessarily entitled to every procedural protection afforded criminal
defendants . . . an incompetent juvenile cannot be found delinquent without violating our basic
concepts of due process of law.”).
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proceeding with an incompetent juvenile would threaten the dignity of
111
the legal process. These arguments overlap substantially with the
rationales behind prohibiting the trial of incompetent defendants.
The first line of reasoning indicates that a substantive due process
right to competence emerges when no amount of process can ensure a
fair and accurate proceeding. The most explicit example of this reasoning
is a decision by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which
observed that the “first function served by the adult competency
requirement and the Dusky standard is to assure that the person charged
with violating the law is able to prepare a defense, in order to increase
112
the accuracy of the factual and guilt determinations.” The court then
found that this function “cannot be fulfilled by procedures other than a
113
Dusky type standard in juvenile delinquency proceedings.” In other
words, a substantive right to competence emerges because no amount of
procedure can ensure the fair adjudication of an incompetent individual.
Other courts likewise connect a right to competence in juvenile
proceedings to fundamental fairness, but do so without explicitly
114
explaining the move from procedural to substantive due process.
The notion that procedural rights can give birth to a substantive
right is neither radical nor new. As Justice John. M. Harlan observed in
his concurrence in In re Gault, “[p]rocedure at once reflects and creates
substantive rights, and every effort of courts since the beginnings of the
115
common law to separate the two has proved essentially futile.” In a
dissenting opinion in Albright v. Oliver, Justice Stevens, in a dissenting
opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, similarly stressed that “[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment contains only one Due Process Clause,” and
“[t]hough it is sometimes helpful, as a matter of doctrine, to distinguish
between substantive and procedural due process, the two concepts are
116
not mutually exclusive, and their protections often overlap.” Federal
appellate courts have also recognized that “sometimes there is overlap”

111. See infra notes 127–142 and accompanying text.
112. In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d at 1267.
113. Id. at 1267 n.7 (emphasis added).
114. See, e.g., In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d at 811 (“Principles of fundamental fairness require that this
right [not to be subjected to a trial] be afforded in juvenile proceedings.”); State ex rel. Causey, 363 So.
2d at 476 (blurring the line between substantive and procedural due process by finding that “the right
not to be tried while incompetent is a due process-fundamental fairness right” that should be
“applicable to juvenile proceedings”).
115. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 70 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 301 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment contains only one Due Process Clause. Though it is sometimes helpful, as a matter of
doctrine, to distinguish between substantive and procedural due process . . . the two concepts are not
mutually exclusive, and their protections often overlap.”); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133
(10th Cir. 1999) (“Competency claims are based either upon substantive due process or procedural
due process, although sometimes there is overlap.”).
116. Albright, 510 U.S. at 301 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
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between substantive and procedural due process in the context of
117
competency claims. Thus, it may be helpful to think of a substantive right
to competence as the end point on a spectrum of procedural protections
when nothing short of such protections will suffice.
The second line of reasoning regarding competence as a precondition
for exercising other rights is exemplified by the decision of a Georgia
appellate court, which found that a twelve-year-old boy with the mental
age of a six-year-old and an IQ of forty was incompetent to stand
118
delinquency proceedings for aggravated sodomy. Noting that In re Gault
confirmed the rights of juveniles to adequate notice of the charges,
appointment of counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the
right to confront opposing witnesses, the court reasoned that “the
cornerstone of these substantive rights is competence to understand the
119
nature of the charges and assist in a defense.” In other words, a “want
120
of competence renders the other rights meaningless.” This view of the
right to competence as a precondition for the exercise of other rights
echoes Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence in Riggins v. Nevada,
which explained:
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main
part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right
to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront,
and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one’s own
121
behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so.

While the Georgia decision considered the collective body of rights
recognized by the Supreme Court in juvenile proceedings, some other
states have placed special emphasis on the right to counsel. For instance,
in reviewing a case involving two juveniles who had committed delinquent
acts, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that as “a matter of constitutional
law, the trial court could go no further with the proceedings” where
“neither minor could competently assist legal counsel in preparing
122
defenses to the delinquency charges.” The court reasoned, “the right to
counsel is meaningless unless that right is interpreted to mean effective
counsel and counsel cannot be effective, particularly with reference to
123
the merits of a case, without the competent cooperation of his client.”
117. Barnett, 174 F.3d at 1133 (“Competency claims are based either upon substantive due process
or procedural due process, although sometimes there is overlap.”).
118. In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d at 812.
119. Id. at 812 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13).
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139–40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation
omitted); see also People v. Carey (In re Carey), 615 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139–40 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); In re Williams, 687 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997) (“Competency is an underlying predicate to due process.”) (quoting Lagway v. Dallman,
806 F. Supp. 1322, 1333 (N.D. Ohio 1992)).
122. In re Two Minor Children, 592 P.2d 166, 169 (Nev. 1979).
123. Id. (citation omitted).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona has held that “the right to
assistance of counsel would be meaningless if the juvenile, through
mental illness, was unable to understand the charges or assist in her own
124
defense.”
Finally, the third line of reasoning emphasizes the nature of the
proceedings in extending the right to competence from criminal trials to
juvenile adjudications. The implicit rationale is that if the proceedings
have the trappings of a criminal trial, then the legal dignity of the process
is threatened if the court proceeds with an incompetent individual. As
the Michigan Court of Appeals explained:
Even though . . . juvenile proceedings are not considered adversarial,
they have many of the trappings of criminal proceedings; the petition is
filed by the prosecutor, notice is required, there must be a preliminary
hearing, which resembles an arraignment in criminal proceedings, and
the functions of the prosecutor and court are the equivalent to their
125
functions in a criminal proceeding.

By looking beyond the technical label of “civil” to the actual nature of
the proceedings, the Michigan court followed In re Gault, which turned
126
on the “reality” of juvenile proceedings. In fact, the Michigan court’s
decision reflects the view expressed by some U.S. Supreme Court
Justices that the proper inquiry is whether, “by our prior cases and by
common sense,” a particular substantive due process claim is “close
enough to the interests that we already have protected to be deemed an
127
aspect of ‘liberty’ as well.”
Only one state—Oklahoma—has explicitly rejected a right to
128
competence for juveniles. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
reasoned that “the nature of juvenile proceedings themselves, being
specifically not criminal proceedings and being directed towards
rehabilitation of a juvenile, indicates . . . the intent of the legislature to

124. See State ex rel. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 619 P.2d 12, 15 (Ariz. 1980) (en banc) (recognizing
that “[i]n the context of a juvenile delinquency adjudicatory proceeding, the right not to be tried or
convicted while incompetent has been held to be a fundamental right”); see also In re Carey, 615 N.W.2d
at 746 (stressing that the right to counsel “means little if the juvenile is unaware of the proceedings or
unable to communicate with counsel because of a psychological or developmental disability”).
125. Id. at 746.
126. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) (powerfully describing the reality of what is at stake in a
juvenile proceeding).
127. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that
substantive due process is about underlying values, rather than “blind imitation of the past”);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 573 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that “[h]istory
and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
inquiry” and arguing that courts may adopt a more expansive view of substantive due process based on
an “emerging awareness” of modern practices) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Redding & Frost, supra note 110, at 368.
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129

deal with juveniles regardless of mental state.” As one article points
out, this decision was made in 1989, before juvenile justice systems had
130
fully transitioned from being rehabilitative to truly penal in nature. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court may therefore reach a different conclusion if
131
it were asked to address this issue today.
This brief review shows widespread consensus that juveniles have a
right to competence in civil delinquency adjudications. Although states
remain divided on other important aspects of the competency
132
determination for juveniles, including the definition of competence and
133
the result of an incompetency finding, the core right to competence is
well established through statutes and case law. The three strands of
reasoning in the decisions discussed above clearly resonate with the core
rationale underlying the prohibition against trial of incompetent
individuals and provide a roadmap for asserting a substantive due
process right to competence in removal proceedings, as discussed further
in Part IV.
C. Mental Competence in Capital Habeas Proceedings
Habeas proceedings, like juvenile adjudications, are quasi-criminal in
nature, although for different reasons. A juvenile adjudication resembles a
criminal trial, whereas a habeas proceeding is “[r]ealistically . . . a stage in
134
the criminal process.” As one federal appellate court observed, “to the
extent that a habeas proceeding reviews a criminal punishment with the
potential of overturning it, the habeas proceeding necessarily assumes
135
part of the underlying case’s criminal nature.” The backward-looking
nature of habeas proceedings was central to the Supreme Court’s
unanimous opinion in the consolidated cases of Ryan v. Gonzales and

129. G.J.I. v. State, 778 P.2d 485, 487 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
130. Redding & Frost, supra note 110, at 373.
131. Id.
132. Some states apply the definition of competence set forth in Dusky and Drope, while others
impose a more restrictive standard for juveniles. Id. at 369–70. Wyoming, for example, requires not
only the presence of mental illness or mental retardation, but also that the juvenile satisfy the criteria
for involuntary civil commitment, which requires the individual to be unable to present a danger to
others or be unable to care for herself. Id. at 370 (citing Wyo. St. Ann. § 14-6-218(c) (2001)).
133. Some statutes provide for dismissal of the charges, while others call for civil commitment of
the juvenile or list a range of options that may include “dismissal, probation, commitment, or filing a
child in needs of services petition.” Id. at 371 (citation omitted). Other differences pertain to the
number of competency evaluations and who may perform them, as well as to the provisions, if any,
addressing restoration to competence. Id. at 370–74.
134. See Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423–24
(1963) (clarifying that a habeas proceeding is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact
considered to be civil in nature), overruled in part by Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
135. See O’Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 505 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Jones v. Cain, 600 F.3d 527,
542 (5th Cir. 2010) (“In rare circumstances, a habeas court can end a state criminal proceeding as part
of the habeas remedy.”).
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Tibbals v. Carter, issued in January 2013, which held that the
incompetence of a state prisoner on death row does not require
136
suspension of his federal habeas proceeding.
In Ryan, which reversed a Ninth Circuit decision deriving a right to
competence from a statute providing a right to counsel in capital habeas
proceedings, the Court explained that “[g]iven the backward-looking,
record-based nature of most federal habeas proceedings, counsel can
generally provide effective representation to a habeas petitioner regardless
137
of the petitioner’s competence.” The Court found that attorneys “are
quite capable of reviewing the state-court record, identifying legal errors,
and marshaling relevant arguments, even without their clients’
138
assistance.” Ryan is therefore not applicable to other contexts that are
closer to trials, such as juvenile adjudications or removal proceedings,
where the incompetent individual would need to play a much more
active role in developing the facts and communicating with counsel.
Indeed, the Court explicitly acknowledged in Ryan “that the benefits
flowing from the right to counsel at trial could be affected if an
139
incompetent defendant is unable to communicate with his attorney.” As
an example, the Court observed that an incompetent individual “would be
unable to assist counsel in identifying witnesses and deciding on a trial
140
strategy.”
The Court’s description of habeas proceedings in Ryan shows that
the reasons behind the prohibition against trying incompetent defendants
136. Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 700, 707 (2013) (holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in
deriving a right to competence from the statutory right to counsel in capital habeas proceedings in
18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2013) and that the Sixth Circuit erred in basing a right to competence on
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) because that statute applies only to federal defendants, not state prisoners, and is
limited to proceedings prior to sentencing and after probation, which do not encompass habeas
proceedings). As a practical matter, the issue of competence usually only arises in habeas proceedings
when the death penalty is involved because a habeas petitioner in a non-capital case has no incentive
to delay or halt the proceedings with a finding of incompetence. See, e.g., Holmes, 506 F.3d at 578–79
(explaining that a habeas petitioner in a non-capital case “usually has little to gain by claiming that he
is incompetent to conduct the postconviction proceeding or, if he has the assistance of a lawyer, to
assist in the lawyer’s conduct of the proceeding,” because a finding of incompetence would simply halt
the proceeding and result in the petitioner “languish[ing] in prison”). If the petitioner is facing the
death penalty, however, he “may prefer to languish in prison than to see his claims for postconviction
relief denied, opening the way to his execution.” Id.
137. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 704. The Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion in Ryan based on two prior
precedents. In Rohan, the court had held that a federal statute guaranteeing state capital prisoners a right
to counsel in federal habeas proceedings could not “be faithfully enforced unless courts ensure that a
petitioner is competent.” Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated by
Ryan, 133 S. Ct. 696. The Ninth Circuit then extended the right to competence to record-based appeals,
explaining that even in this situation, a petitioner is not “relegated to a nonexistent role,” as “[m]eaningful
assistance of appellate counsel may require rational communication between counsel and a habeas
petitioner.” Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Ryan, 133 S. Ct. 696.
138. Ryan, 133 S. Ct. at 705.
139. Id. at 703.
140. Id.
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do not apply to the habeas context. Not only does the backward-looking
nature of habeas result in the petitioner playing a different role with
counsel, but it also means that many of the other rights that require
competence are simply not applicable to habeas. For example, the rights
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to testify on one’s own behalf
have no relevance to habeas proceedings. Consequently, proceeding with
an incompetent petitioner does not give rise to the same concerns about
jeopardizing the fairness and accuracy of the proceedings or compromising
other constitutional rights. Furthermore, since most habeas writs are
decided without any court hearing at all, moving forward with an
incompetent petitioner cannot be analogized to an in absentia trial.
Finally, the incompetence of a habeas petitioner does not pose the
same threat to the moral dignity of the legal process as the incompetence
of a criminal defendant or juvenile because no “prosecution” is taking
place that requires meaningful moral understanding of wrongdoing and
punishment. Habeas is an action brought by the petitioner against the
141
warden of the state prison, not a proceeding against the petitioner. A
habeas petitioner collaterally attacks a conviction that occurred at an
142
earlier state trial; she does not mount a defense. The state court has
already entered “a presumptively valid judgment,” and the petitioner
143
must have been competent at that time to be convicted. Thus, the
phase for concern about moral understanding of wrongdoing has passed.
In short, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ryan leaves completely
open the question of whether a right to competence might exist in a
different type of quasi-criminal context that more closely resembles a
trial. Removal proceedings, where trial attorneys engage in active
prosecution and testimony plays a crucial role, have no resemblance to
habeas proceedings and require a very different analysis.

III. Mental Competence in Quasi-Criminal Removal Proceedings
Removal proceedings, like juvenile adjudications, are technically
civil but courts and commentators alike have recognized their quasi144
criminal nature. The Supreme Court acknowledged over half a century
141. Id. at 707.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 709.
144. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal
Divide, supra note 3, at 290–91 (distinguishing exclusion from expulsion, and arguing that “the
determination of whether to expel a noncitizen whom the government has previously invited into the
national community as a lawful permanent resident is a criminal proceeding, in which the defendant is
entitled to the full panoply of criminal procedural protections guaranteed by the Constitution”);
Markowitz, Deportation is Different, supra note 3 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Padilla represents an important departure from precedents that treat deportation proceedings as
purely civil); Eagly, supra note 9 (describing how immigration enforcement and criminal processes are
intertwined).
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ago that deportation can be a more severe penalty than criminal
punishment because it “may result in poverty, persecution and even
145
146
death” or “of all that makes life worth living.” More recently, in
Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court acknowledged “the seriousness of
deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea,” and held that an
attorney’s failure to advise defendants about the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions may constitute ineffective assistance
147
of counsel and violate the Sixth Amendment.
Almost every aspect of removal proceedings more closely resembles
a criminal proceeding than a civil one. ICE normally initiates the process
by issuing a warrant for the noncitizen’s arrest and filing a charging
148
document called the “Notice to Appear” with the immigration court.
At the first hearing, the respondent usually admits or denies the charges,
149
which is similar to an arraignment. A trial attorney with DHS plays the
role of “prosecutor” and has the burden of establishing removability by
“clear and convincing” evidence, a standard that is higher than the
150
“preponderance of the evidence” standard used in most civil cases.
Once removability is established, the immigrant has the right to file
various applications for relief from removal and carries the burden of
establishing eligibility for those forms of relief, similar to presenting
151
affirmative defenses in a criminal case.
The Immigration Judge
schedules a “merits” hearing that resembles a mini-trial on these
152
applications. Unlike criminal trials, however, the immigrant is often
unrepresented, normally testifies, and is subject to vigorous cross153
examination by the trial attorney. Lay and expert witnesses may also
154
be called and cross-examined. At the end of the merits hearing, the
155
judge decides whether to grant relief or issue an order of removal. The
judge’s decision may be appealed to the BIA, and the BIA’s decision
may be appealed to the federal appellate court with jurisdiction over the
156
state where the immigration court proceeding occurred.
During these removal proceedings, ICE may decide to detain the
157
noncitizen. In fact, immigration detainees—even those with no criminal

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 136, 164 (1945).
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374.
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2014).
Id. § 1240.10(c).
Id. § 1240.8(a).
Id. § 1240.8(d).
Id. §§ 1240.7, 1240.9, 1240.10.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.3, 1240.9.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1).
8 C.F.R. § 1240.12.
Id. § 1240.15.
8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a), (c)(1).
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record—and inmates serving criminal sentences are frequently held
158
together in the same facility. Detained noncitizens may request a bond
hearing before the immigration judge, which is very similar to a bail
159
hearing. However, large categories of immigrants are not eligible for
release on bond and therefore remain detained for years while their
160
cases are pending in immigration court or on appeal.
This description shows that removal proceedings, like juvenile
adjudications, have many of the trappings of criminal trials. Yet
incompetent respondents facing deportation receive minimal protections.
A. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Pertaining to Mental
Incompetence
The INA and its regulations provide little guidance on how to treat
incompetent individuals in removal proceedings. The sole statutory
provision that addresses incompetency vaguely provides: “If it is
impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental incompetency for the alien to
be present at the proceeding, the Attorney General shall prescribe
161
safeguards to protect the rights and privileges of the alien.” As discussed
further below, any immigrant who lacks competence is arguably not
“present” in the proceedings, but the usefulness of this provision is
limited because the Attorney General has thus far failed to prescribe any
safeguards.
The regulations likewise fail to protect the interests of incompetent
noncitizens. Regarding service of process, the regulations actually make
it easier to deport incompetent individuals who are confined to an
institution or hospital by disposing of the requirement that they be
served personally and permitting service on the person in charge of the
162
facility to suffice. For incompetent individuals who are not confined,

158. In FY 2013, nearly seventy percent of detained immigrants were held in one of 244 state and
county jails contracted to house immigrant detainees on behalf of ICE. See Dep’t of Homeland
Security, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Salaries and Expenses, Fiscal Years 2012–
2014 Congressional Budget Justification 44 (2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/MGMT/DHS-%20Annual%20Performance%20Report%20and%20CongressionalBudget-Justification-FY2014.pdf.
159. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a)–(b); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1.
160. Several categories of noncitizens are not eligible for bond hearings in immigration court,
including: those subject to mandatory detention under the INA: “arriving aliens” (those who showed
up at a point of entry and asked for admission to the United States, including asylum-seekers); and
immigrants placed in “asylum only” proceedings. See INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (concerning
mandatory detention of certain criminal aliens); INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (concerning arriving
aliens).
161. INA § 240a(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3).
162. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(c)(2)(ii). The BIA recently held that when there are indicia of a
respondent’s mental incompetency, DHS should serve the notice to appear on three individuals: (1) a
person with whom the respondent resides, who, when the respondent is detained in a penal or mental
institution, will be someone in a position of demonstrated authority in the institution or his or her
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the regulation allows service on any person with whom an incompetent
person resides, without consideration of whether that person is competent
163
herself or has the best interests of the respondent at heart.
Moreover, far from requiring appointment of counsel, or even a
guardian ad litem for an incompetent respondent, the regulation provides
that any “guardian, near relative, or friend” may appear on behalf of a
respondent when it is “impracticable for the respondent to be present at
164
the hearing because of mental incompetency.” Thus, an incompetent
respondent facing deportation receives less protection than civil litigants
receive in federal court because the federal rule provides that the “court
must appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to
protect a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an
165
action.” The immigration regulation merely states that a guardian, near
relative, or friend “shall be permitted to appear on behalf of the
respondent,” which allows the immigration court to play a much more
166
passive role.
The regulations also provide no criteria for evaluating whether a
given person is appropriate for the role of appearing on behalf of the
incompetent respondent, such as whether the person is free of conflicts
of interest, will represent the best interests of the respondent, or has any
167
knowledge of the immigration system. During interviews with Human
Rights Watch, some advocates reported encountering legal guardians in
immigration cases who “could not identify the interests or will of the
168
client.” Even worse, the regulations specify that if a guardian, relative,
or friend cannot be found or fails to appear, the immigration court may
actually request “the custodian of the respondent” to appear on the
169
respondent’s behalf.
This means that if ICE has detained the
respondent, the very agency seeking to deport the respondent may appear

delegate and, when the respondent is not detained, will be a responsible party in the household, if
available; (2) whenever applicable or possible, a relative, guardian, or person similarly close to the
respondent; and (3) in most cases, the respondent. See In re E-S-I-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 136, 136 (B.I.A. 2013).
Thus, while the BIA encouraged service on the respondent, it did not hold that this is always required.
163. 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(c)(2)(ii).
164. Id. § 1240.4.
165. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (emphasis added).
166. Cf. id. (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.4.
167. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.4. In litigation challenging these regulations, the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) stressed that the regulations “allow a system to exist with lower standards for the
representation of an incompetent individual, allowing untrained representatives with potential and
unexamined conflicts of interest to waive non-citizens’ fundamental rights without their consent or
even comprehension.” See First Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relieve and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 30 ¶ 92, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-02211
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2010-8-2-GonzalezvHolderAmendedComplaint.pdf.
168. Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 72 n.252.
169. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.4 (emphasis added).
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on her behalf. Despite the clear conflict of interest that this provision
creates, courts have permitted detention center employees to represent
170
respondents in removal proceedings. In order to be appointed a
guardian ad litem, on the other hand, a person must, at a minimum,
171
demonstrate independence and competence.
In addition, the regulations explicitly allow an immigration judge to
accept an admission of removability from an incompetent individual who
lacks counsel as long as that individual is accompanied by a “near relative,
172
legal guardian, or friend.” The question of whether or not someone is
removable from the United States can be extremely complicated, both
legally and factually. Allowing an unrepresented, incompetent individual
to admit to removability simply because he or she appears in court with a
“friend,” who may have absolutely no knowledge of the legal issues or
the facts of the case, fails to safeguard the respondent’s interests. Since
2011, recent developments have attempted to increase procedural due
process protections for incompetent individuals facing deportation, but
the idea of a substantive due process right to competence has neither
been asserted nor addressed.
B. Recent Developments Regarding Mental Incompetence
1. Introduction of “Safeguards” Under In re M-A-MIn 2011, the BIA finally provided some framework for addressing
173
questions of competency in removal proceedings.
In re M-A-Maddressed when an immigration judge should make a competency
determination, what factors a judge should consider and what procedures
to follow to reach that determination, and the types of “safeguards” that
174
may be prescribed when the respondent is found incompetent. First,
the BIA found that “an alien is presumed to be competent to participate
in removal proceedings,” so “[a]bsent indicia of mental incompetency, an
Immigration Judge is under no obligation to analyze an alien’s
175
competency.”
This finding is consistent with the law regarding
176
competency in criminal cases.
The BIA noted that indicia of

170. Tex. Appleseed, Justice for Immigration’s Hidden Population 51 (2010).
171. See, e.g., Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) gives the district court the power to “effectuate its appointment
of a competent, independent guardian ad litem”).
172. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c).
173. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 474 (B.I.A. 2011).
174. Id. at 476.
175. Id. at 477.
176. See, e.g., Porter v. McKaskle, 466 U.S. 984, 985 (1984) (“It is settled that, if evidence available
to a trial judge raises a bona fide doubt regarding a defendant’s ability to understand and participate in
the proceedings against him, the judge has an obligation to order an examination to assess his
competency, even if the defendant does not request such an exam.”).
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incompetency could include “the inability to understand and respond to
questions, the inability to stay on topic, or a high level of distraction,” as
well as documentary evidence, such as assessments of the respondent’s
177
mental health, testimony from professionals, and school records.
Significantly, the BIA acknowledged that DHS is often in possession
of relevant documents, especially when the respondent is detained, and
found that “DHS has an obligation to provide the court with relevant
materials in its possession that would inform the court about the
178
respondent’s mental competency.” This part of the holding is important
because trial attorneys have not always submitted evidence of
incompetence to the immigration court. Human Rights Watch has
documented cases in which trial attorneys failed to inform the court that
the respondent had a mental disability, as well as cases where they
refused or neglected to supply information to the court, even when
179
specifically ordered to do so. Interviews conducted with immigration
judges and attorneys indicated that ICE trial attorneys often “resisted
efforts . . . to accommodate non-citizens with mental disabilities by
providing mental health evaluations, sharing medical records with the
court or attorneys, or agreeing to terminate cases where the person in
180
proceedings cannot participate or protect his or her rights.”
In re M-A-M- does not require a competency hearing once questions
of competency come to light. In fact, the decision does not even require a
professional mental competency evaluation, much less one paid for by the
government. Rather, the decision vaguely instructs immigration judges to
“take measures to determine whether a respondent is competent to
181
participate in proceedings.” Such measures may include simply asking
questions to the respondent, granting continuances to allow the parties
177. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479–80. Other evidence could include reports from teachers,
counselors, or social workers; participation in programs for persons with mental illness; applications
for disability benefits; and affidavits or testimony from friends or family members. Id.
178. Id. at 480. ICE attorneys are usually in the best position to obtain medical records in a prompt
manner, as FOIA requests for a detainee’s medical records can take several months to process,
making it difficult for an attorney to present timely evidence of incompetence. Moreover, detainees
are frequently transferred between detention centers without their medical records. See Justice for
Immigration’s Hidden Population, supra note 170, at 41 (“[E]ven when records exist and can be
found, immigrants and their lawyers have difficulty accessing those records.”).
179. Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 34, 48. For example, in one case before the Boston
Immigration Court, the ICE attorney revealed that the respondent had been previously found
incompetent in criminal court only after the judge remarked that the respondent appeared to have a
mental disability. Id. at 34 (quoting Telephone Interview by Human Rights Watch with John Pollock,
Nat’l Lawyers Guild (Dec. 7, 2009)) (discussing observations of immigration court proceedings in
Boston, including a case witnessed on November 2003). In another case, an ICE attorney who
repeatedly failed to produce the competency evaluation requested by the immigration judge told the
court “there aren’t sufficient resources for us to do the evaluation.” Id. at 48 (quoting Telephone
Interview, supra).
180. Id. at 49.
181. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 480.
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time to submit evidence regarding the respondent’s mental health,
changing venue to allow a respondent to be closer to family or treatment
182
programs, or requesting a mental competency evaluation. Judges are
supposed to “weigh” the results from these measures to determine if the
183
respondent is competent. Thus, In re M-A-M- permits the procedure
for determining competency to be completely ad hoc.
The test for competency to participate in immigration proceedings is
also deficient because the standard is whether the respondent “has a
rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of the
proceedings, can consult with the attorney or representative if there is
one, and has a reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence
184
and cross-examine witnesses.” Under this test, a significant part of the
Dusky/Drope standard simply drops out of the analysis for respondents
who are pro se, making it easier for them to be deemed competent than
185
respondents with representation. This paradoxical result conflicts with
Edwards, which recognized the appropriateness of applying a higher
186
standard of competence for self-representation. Federal courts should
reject the BIA’s definition of competence under the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance because it raises serious constitutional concerns
187
under the due process clause. However, even if the BIA’s definition
were treated as a statutory or regulatory interpretation that deserves
deferential review, courts should reject it as unreasonable or plainly
erroneous because it requires a lower standard of competence for pro se
188
respondents than for those with counsel.
If a respondent is found incompetent under the test in In re M-A-M-,
then the result is not termination of the removal proceedings, but simply

182. Id. at 480–81.
183. Id. at 481.
184. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
185. See supra note 84.
186. In Edwards, the Court explained that the standards in Drope and Dusky “assume
representation by counsel and emphasize the importance of counsel.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S.
164, 174 (2008). These standards “thus suggest (though do not hold) that an instance in which a
defendant who would choose to forgo counsel at trial presents a very different set of circumstances,
which in our view, calls for a different standard.” Id. at 174–75.
187. Agencies’ constitutional interpretations are not entitled to judicial deference. See, e.g., United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–05 (1974); CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973).
Indeed, “[i]t is . . . a ‘permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system’ that ‘the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.’” United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616–17 n.7 (2000) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922–23 (1995)).
188. An agency’s interpretation of its statute is normally reviewed under Chevron, which requires
courts to defer to any reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous term. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). An agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation is reviewed under Seminole Rock, which requires deference unless the agency’s
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
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that the judge should employ so-called “safeguards.” The decision
gives judges total discretion to decide what kind of safeguards would be
190
appropriate.
While the BIA gives some examples of safeguards,
191
appointment of counsel is notably absent from that list. In fact, instead
of requiring appointed counsel, the BIA suggests that the participation of
192
a family member, friend, or guardian somehow serves as a safeguard.
The BIA also entrusts the judge to take on certain roles traditionally
performed by counsel, such as “actively aiding in the development of the
record, including the examination and cross-examination of witnesses”
193
and “reserving appeal rights for the respondent.” In re M-A-Mtherefore takes a very different approach than the recommendations set
forth in this Article, which maintain that appointment of counsel is
necessary for all individuals in removal proceedings who do not meet the
heightened standard of competence necessary for self-representation.
Moreover, the BIA does not explain how the safeguards that it
mentions would actually help provide a full and fair hearing to an
incompetent individual. For example, continuances may be helpful in the
short-term but are of little use if the respondent cannot afford counsel or
194
additional medical treatment. Other supposed safeguards noted in the
decision, such as “closing the hearing to the public” and “waiving the
respondent’s appearance,” may actually undermine rather than promote
195
a fair hearing. Thus, while In re M-A-M- made important strides in
requiring immigration judges to grapple with questions of competence, it
set an unreasonably low standard of competence for unrepresented
individuals and did not require competency hearings or appointed
counsel, leaving much to the discretion of immigration judges.
2. The Franco-Gonzalez Litigation
In 2010, before the In re M-A-M- decision, a coalition of legal
organizations filed a class action lawsuit in a Los Angeles federal district
court on behalf of immigrant detainees in California, Arizona, and

189. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 477–82.
190. Id. at 482–83.
191. Id. at 483.
192. Id.; cf. Amelia Wilson & Natalie H. Prokop, Applying Method to the Madness: The Right to
Court Appointed Guardians Ad Litem and Counsel for the Mentally Ill in Immigration Proceedings,
16 U. Pa. J. L. & Soc. Change 1, 1 (2013) (arguing for concurrent appointment of both guardians ad
litem and counsel for mentally ill individuals).
193. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 483.
194. See id. at 483 (stating that safeguards may include “docketing or managing the case to
facilitate the respondent’s ability to obtain legal representation and/or medical treatment in an effort
to restore competency,” as well as “continuance of the case for good cause shown”).
195. Id.
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196

Washington with severe mental disabilities. The named plaintiffs had
been diagnosed with mental disabilities ranging from schizophrenia to
mental retardation, and several had been found incompetent to stand
197
trial in other court proceedings. The lead plaintiff, Jose Antonio
Franco-Gonzales, did not know his own age or birthday and could not
198
tell time or dial phone numbers. An immigration judge had found him
incompetent and administratively closed his case in 2005, but he
continued to languish in immigration detention for almost five more
199
years without a bond hearing. The lawsuit alleged violations under the
INA, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and section 504
200
of the Rehabilitation Act.
The complaint alleged that mentally
incompetent immigrant detainees should be appointed competent
201
representation and that they should have a right to a bond hearing.
After the class was certified, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial
202
summary judgment and a permanent injunction. The district court’s
order, issued in April 2013, broke new ground by embracing a disability
rights framework for analyzing mentally incompetent individuals’ right to
appointed counsel, relying on a theory of reasonable accommodation.
The court held that appointment of counsel is required under section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, which forbids federally funded agencies from
excluding or denying individuals with disabilities an equal opportunity to
203
access program benefits and services.
The court reasoned that
appointing counsel is the only reasonable accommodation through which
196. The lawsuit was litigated by the ACLU of Southern California, ACLU Immigrants’ Rights
Project, Public Counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, ACLU of San Diego, ACLU of Arizona, Mental
Health Advocacy Services, and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project. First Amended Complaint,
supra note 167.
197. Id. at 4–6.
198. Press Release, ACLU, Immigrants with Mental Disabilities Lost in Detention for Years,
(Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-prisoners-rights/immigrantsmental-disabilities-lost-detention-years.
199. First Amended Complaint, supra note 167, at 4.
200. Id. at 35–40.
201. See Order re Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction on Behalf of Seven Class Members at 12, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, (No. 1002211), 2013 WL 3674492, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
202. The certified class was defined as “[a]ll individuals who are or will be in DHS custody for
removal proceedings in California, Arizona, and Washington who have been identified by or to
medical personnel, DHS, or an Immigration Judge, as having a serious mental disorder or defect that
may render the incompetent to represent themselves in detention or removal proceedings, and who
presently lack counsel in their removal proceedings.” Id. at 2. This class included two subclasses:
(1) individuals who had a serious mental disorder or defect that rendered them incompetent to
represent themselves in detention or removal proceedings; and (2) individuals who had been detained
for more than six months. Id.
203. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2013). Establishing a prima facie case under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act requires showing, among other things, that a recipience of federal funding denied someone a
benefit solely because of a disability. Id. § 794(a). In this case, the benefit denied to the plaintiffs was
full participation in their removal proceedings. See Order re Plaintiffs’ Motion, supra note 201, at 3.
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mentally incompetent detainees in removal proceedings can meaningfully
exercise certain statutory “benefits,” namely “a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against [them], to present evidence on [their] own
204
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.”
In reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly rejected the argument
205
that In re M-A-M- provides sufficient safeguards. In addition, the court
held that mentally incompetent detainees are entitled to a bond hearing
206
within 180 days.
While the decision in Franco-Gonzales represents a huge step
forward, it has limitations. First, it focuses only on appointment of counsel
as a procedural due process protection and does not address the issue of
whether incompetent individuals may be subjected to removal proceedings
in the first place. Furthermore, it does not question the definition of
competence set forth in In re M-A-M- or recognize that a heightened
standard of competence is necessary for self-representation. Thus, the
category of individuals who would be appointed counsel under FrancoGonzales is smaller than the category of individuals who would be
appointed counsel under the framework proposed in this Article.
3. DHS Announces New Nationwide Policy in April 2013
At the same time that the federal district court announced FrancoGonzalez, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and DHS announced a
new nationwide policy for immigration detainees with serious mental
207
disabilities. The government indicated that this policy would take effect
nationally by the end of 2013, but a year later, as this Article goes to
208
print, the implementation is just getting started. The policy addresses
screening for mental conditions, competency hearings, appointment of
counsel, and bond hearings. To begin with, the policy provides that
detainees in a facility staffed by ICE Health Service Corps will be screened
209
for serious mental disorders and conditions when taken into custody.
DHS states that it will also work with non-ICE Health Service Corps
staffed detention facilities to identify detainees with serious mental
210
disorders or conditions, although the policy fails to provide any specifics.

204. Order re Plaintiffs’ Motion, supra note 201, at 6; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2014).
205. The court pointed out that it was undisputed that In re M-A-M- did not suggest any authority
to appoint a “Qualified Representative” to incompetent individuals. The court also noted that the
majority of safeguards in In re M-A-M- were left to the immigration judge’s discretion and therefore
did not guarantee that an incompetent individual would be able to participate as fully in her removal
proceeding as a competent person. Id. at 6–7.
206. Id. at 8.
207. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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In addition, the policy instructs immigration judges to convene a
competency hearing if the court learns of any indication of mental
211
incompetency. An immigration judge who feels unable to make a
competency determination based on the evidence presented at that
hearing is authorized to order an independent exam and psychiatric or
212
psychological report. The competency exams will be administered
through program run by the Executive Office for Immigration Review
213
(“EOIR”) and performed by independent medical professionals. As of
yet, the EOIR has not provided any details regarding the operation of
this program or how the medical professionals will be selected or paid.
The policy further provides that “EOIR will make available a
qualified representative to detainees who are deemed mentally
214
incompetent to represent themselves.” To date, no details have been
provided regarding who will be considered a “qualified representative,”
how representatives will be selected and assigned to individual cases, and
whether or how the representatives will be paid. The policy also does not
specify whether qualified representatives will be made available only at
the immigration court level or for appeals as well. Lastly, consistent with
Franco-Gonzalez, the new policy states that detainees identified as
having a serious mental disorder have a right to a bond hearing once they
have been detained for six months.
If this policy is implemented, it will represent an enormous step
forward in protecting the procedural due process rights of noncitizens
with mental disabilities. One major limitation of the policy, however, is
that it applies only to detainees. Non-detained individuals with serious
mental disabilities in removal proceedings should also have a right to a
competency hearing and appointed counsel. Another limitation of the
policy is that it does not discuss termination of cases in which the
respondent is incompetent. Termination would be consistent with
recognizing a right to competence in removal proceedings, which either
courts or Congress should do for the reasons set forth below.

IV. Reasons to Recognize a Right to Competence in Removal
Proceedings
Providing appointed counsel and competency hearings would
significantly increase the procedural protections for individuals with
mental disabilities facing removal. Several commentators have already
argued quite persuasively that appointed counsel is critical for this

211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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215

population. This Article goes further, however, arguing that the
presence of counsel is not sufficient to protect the fairness and accuracy
of the hearing, especially when the definition of incompetence indicates
that the respondent is unable to assist counsel. Recognizing a substantive
due process right to competence—or creating the right by statute—is the
only way to ensure that incompetent individuals are not deported in
error. Taking this step by no means eliminates the need for robust
procedural protections. Procedural due process is necessary, at a
216
minimum, to identify those who are truly incompetent. However, once
an individual’s incompetence is established, a right to competence would
serve as a backstop that prevents deportation. The reasons underlying
the prohibition against the trial of incompetent individuals provide a
roadmap for showing why such a right should also be recognized in
removal proceedings.
In addition, this Article contends that counsel must be appointed for
those who do not meet the higher standard of competence required for
self-representation. If counsel cannot be appointed to such individuals,
then their cases also must be terminated. Defining the higher standard of
competence is a challenging task that is beyond the scope of this
217
Article. Indeed, it is not clear whether the standard should be precisely
218
defined. This Article simply seeks to explain why courts should adopt a
higher competence standard for self-representation in removal
proceedings. This explanation draws on the same reasons underlying the
prohibition against trial of incompetent individuals. As the Supreme
Court stressed in Edwards, protecting the accuracy and dignity of the
215. See generally Alice Clapman, Hearing difficult Voices: The Due Process Rights of Mentally
Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 New Eng. L. Rev. 373 (2011) (arguing that mentally
disabled individuals should have a right to counsel in removal proceedings); Aliza B. Kaplan, Disabled
and Disserved: The Right to Counsel for Mentally Disabled Aliens in Removal Proceedings, 26 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 523 (2012) (same); Wilson & Prokop, supra note 192; see also Representation in Removal
Proceedings, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1658, 1659 (2013) (proposing “a right to appointed counsel for three
classes of noncitizens—lawful permanent residents, the mentally ill, and juveniles”).
216. Several individuals with serious mental conditions who took “voluntary deportations” turned
out to be U.S. citizens. See Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 4.
217. For discussions of the standard for representational competence, see generally E. Lea Johnston,
Representational Competence Defining the Limits of the Right to Self-Representation at Trial, 86 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 523 (2011); E. Lea Johnston, Setting the Standard: A Critique of Bonnie’s Competency
Standard and the Potential for Problem-Solving Theory for Self-Representation at Trial, 43 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1605 (2010); Jason R. Marks, State Competence Standards for Self-Representation in a Criminal Trial:
Opportunity and Danger for State Courts After Indiana v. Edwards, 44 U.S.F. L. Rev. 825 (2010); see also
Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right to Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony
Defendant, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 423, 447–50 (2007) (finding that twenty-six percent of pro se defendants
received felony convictions, compared with sixty-three percent of their represented counterparts).
218. See, e.g., Jacob J. Stender, Protect Me From Myself: Determining Competency to Waive the
Right to Counsel During Civil Commitment Proceedings in Washington State, 35 Seattle U. L. Rev.
973, 980–82 (arguing that “a heightened but unarticulated standard” for competency to represent
oneself provides the discretion needed to make accurate and fair decisions based on the particular
facts of the case).
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proceedings becomes an especially critical concern when the defendant is
219
unrepresented. Likewise, in the removal context, the absence of a lawyer
intensifies concerns about reaching the correct decision, protecting
constitutional and statutory rights, and safeguarding the dignity of the
process.
Recognizing that competence falls along a spectrum rather than
being a binary trait is especially important in the immigration context
220
because of the high rates of pro se respondents. In the criminal context,
where lawyers are generally appointed, the focus is understandably on
competence to stand trial, but in the immigration context, the court
should focus equally on competence for self-representation. While the
relative sizes of these two groups may be different in the criminal and
immigration contexts, it is still possible—and advisable—to consistently
define the groups and their due process rights. The various reasons
underlying the prohibition against trial of incompetent individuals, which
also support a higher competence standard for self-representation, are
addressed in detail below.
A. Protecting the Fairness and Accuracy of Removal Proceedings
Neither the “safeguards” mentioned in In re M-A-M- nor
appointment of counsel is always sufficient to protect the fairness and
accuracy of a removal proceeding. In criminal cases, counsel is almost
always provided, yet concerns regarding fairness and accuracy still justify
221
the prohibition against trial of incompetent individuals. These concerns
are even greater in removal proceedings because the respondent
generally plays a more active role than a defendant facing criminal trial.
In removal proceedings, there is no prohibition against drawing an
222
adverse inference if a respondent chooses not to testify. Indeed, the

219. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176–77 (2008).
220. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
221. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (guaranteeing that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 343 (1963) (holding, in a case involving a felony, that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Sixth, so that “one charged with a crime” has a right to counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972) (extending Gideon to misdemeanors that carry jail sentences); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373
(1979) (holding that a defendant who faced only a fine, rather than incarceration, was not entitled to
counsel); see also Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Towards a Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 585, 585 (2011)
(explaining the limits of the Sixth Amendment and how criminal offenses that do not trigger the right to
counsel can still expose a noncitizen to deportation).
222. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 309, 318 (1976) (recognizing that “the prevailing rule that
the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they
refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them”); Gutierrez v. Holder,
662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011). But see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (holding that,
in a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s
silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt”).
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norm is for the respondent to testify in order to provide crucial evidence,
223
establish her credibility, and merit a favorable exercise of discretion. In
cases where the respondent has legal status and is challenging
deportability rather than applying for some form of relief, the legal issues
may still turn on certain facts and require testimony by the respondent. If
the respondent cannot communicate these facts, then appointment of
counsel will not ensure a fair proceeding. This Subpart addresses both
credibility determinations and citizenship determinations as two examples
of important issues where the presence of an attorney may not overcome
the challenges posed by incompetency.
1. Credibility Determinations
Establishing the noncitizen’s credibility is critical for virtually all
applications for relief from removal. Credibility is especially important,
however, in cases involving applications for asylum, withholding of
224
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In
such cases, an adverse credibility finding may result in someone being
removed to a country where her life or safety is in danger. Applicants for
asylum and related forms of relief are also particularly likely to suffer
from mental illnesses, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, related to
past experiences of persecution that can affect the quality of their
225
testimony. In evaluating an applicant’s testimony, an immigration
judge must “determine whether or not the testimony is credible, is
223. See INA § 240(c)(4)(A)(i)–(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2014).
224. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Refugee Credibility Assessment and the “Religious Imposter”
Problem: A Case Study of Eritrean Pentecostal Claims in Egypt, 43 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1179, 1185
(2010) (noting that “[e]ven vague and incoherent testimony may not definitively indicate fraud,
because cultural barriers, language and interpretation problems, mental health issues, and the general
limitations of human memory and communication can produce honest testimony that nevertheless
appears superficially incredible”); Stuart L. Lustig, Symptoms of Trauma Among Political Asylum
Applicants: Don’t Be Fooled, 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 725, 729 (2008) (discussing how
psychological trauma can lead to inconsistencies that may be misinterpreted during an asylum hearing
as showing a lack of credibility); Carol M. Suzuki, Unpacking Pandora’s Box: Innovative Techniques
for Effectively Counseling Asylum Applicants Suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
4 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 235, 241, 253–64 (2007) (addressing “how PTSD alters an asylum
applicant’s detail and consistency of memory, thus affecting the applicant’s credibility and chance of
being granted asylum”). See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
225. See, e.g., Juliet Cohen, Questions of Credibility: Omissions, Discrepancies and Errors of Recall
in the Testimony of Asylum Seekers. 13 Int’l J. Refugee L. 293, 308 (2001) (urging “great caution” in
denying asylum based on credibility and noting that “a general impairment of recall is to be expected
as a result of their traumatic experiences and physical and mental state”); Brianna M. Mooty, Solving
the Medical Crisis for Immigration Detainees: Is the Proposed Detainee Basic Medical Care Act of 2008
the Answer?, 28 Law. & Ineq. 223, 251 (2010) (explaining that “[t]he same experiences that are often
the bedrock of asylum claims put these asylum-seekers at a significant risk of suffering post-traumatic
stress and other mental health issues”); Suzuki, supra note 224 (explaining that post-traumatic stress
disorder affects an asylum applicant’s memory, impacting the detail and consistency of the testimony);
Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 36–37.
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persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the
226
applicant has satisfied the applicant’s burden of proof.” The INA
further provides that a credibility determination should be based on the
totality of the circumstances, including demeanor, responsiveness,
plausibility, consistency, and any inaccuracies or falsehoods, regardless of
227
whether or not they go to the heart of the claim.
An individual with severe mental disabilities is likely to have great
difficulty in providing testimony that satisfies all of the above criteria.
Someone with paranoid schizophrenia may conflate real and imagined
forms of persecution. If called upon to testify, this individual might easily
lapse from an accurate account of her past and the harm that she fears
into a delusional narrative. There is nothing an attorney could do to
prevent this result. While the attorney could introduce evidence about
the client’s mental illness and objective country reports about the harm
that the individual would face if deported, the trial attorney and judge
may still take the position that the person is not credible. In fact, Human
Rights Watch has documented cases in which the mere presence of a
228
mental illness has led to adverse credibility findings. In such situations,
where the respondent’s own testimony plays a crucial role in deciding
whether she should be allowed to remain in the country, no amount of
procedure can ensure that an incompetent individual will receive a fair
and accurate hearing. Only a right to competence would protect against
erroneous deportations.
2. Citizenship Determinations
In some cases, critical facts might support a challenge to removability,
but an attorney might have no way of accessing those facts if the client is
incompetent. Multiple accounts of U.S. citizens with serious mental
disabilities being erroneously deported to foreign countries show that
DHS is often unaware of crucial facts when it decides to pursue
229
deportation. In some cases, a mentally incompetent respondent might

226. INA § 240(c)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B).
227. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
228. For example, Michael A. suffered from psychosis and was denied asylum because the asylum
officer found that his delusions rendered his testimony inherently implausible, reasoning that his
psychosis “calls into question the entire credibility of his claim.” Deportation by Default, supra note
7, at 29. Likewise, the government argued that Edwin B., who had fled Liberia, was not a credible
witness because of his mental disability and should be denied relief. Id. at 38.
229. In 2000, for example, immigration authorities deported Sharon McKnight, a U.S. citizen with
cognitive disabilities who was returning from a trip to visit her family in Jamaica. Deportation by
Default, supra note 7, at 4. In 2007, ICE wrongfully deported Pedro Guzman, a U.S. citizen with
development disabilities, who was lost in Mexico for almost three months before being located and
returned to in California. Id. In 2008, ICE deported a U.S. citizen named Mark Lyttle, who had been
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and development disabilities because, according to ICE, he had signed
a statement saying that he was a Mexican national. Id.
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not know where she was born or may be unable to intelligibly
communicate this information. In other cases, determinations of
citizenship can be very complex, requiring detailed information about the
respondent’s parents or even grandparents. In Dent v. Holder, for
example, the Ninth Circuit remanded a case where the petitioner’s claim
to citizenship turned on an adoptive mother’s birth in the United
230
States. If Dent had been incompetent, he may never have been able to
raise the issue of his citizenship, and a lawyer, even if he had one, might
have no way of knowing about his adoptive mother.
According to Jacqueline Stevens, an estimated 4000 U.S. citizens
were erroneously detained or deported as aliens in 2010, and the number
231
has exceeded 20,000 since 2003. A “disproportionate” number of these
232
individuals suffer from mental illness. In some cases, mental illness has
233
led citizens to assert false claims of alienage. For example, when
“Anna,” who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, was arrested for
prostitution in Phoenix in October 2007, she told police that she was
born in Paris; earlier, in 1991, when applying for a U.S. passport, she had
234
stated that she was born in Tehran. She had also reported at various
235
points that “JFK is her father and the Pope is her father.” The Arizona
Superior Court dismissed the criminal charges against her, finding her
236
incompetent to stand trial. Yet, based solely on her claim that she was
born in Paris, ICE detained Anna and placed her in removal
237
proceedings. Despite having Anna’s psychiatric records, the immigration
238
judge ordered her deported to France. France, of course, refused to
issue travel documents because she was not a French citizen, but Anna
239
remained detained for several months. In this situation, where an
immigration judge is inclined to believe statements made by a person

230. Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 369–73 (9th Cir. 2010).
231. See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens
As Aliens, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 606, 608 (2011); see also Lisa DiVirgilio, Report: Hundreds of U.S.
Citizens Wrongfully Deported Every Year, Syracuse (July 26, 2010, 9:52 AM), http://
www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2010/07/report_hundreds_of_us_citizens.html
(describing
how
Francis’s story is part of a potentially larger trend of deportations of U.S. citizens).
232. Stevens, supra note 231, at 612.
233. See id. at 628; see also Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law,
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 8 (2008) (statement of Rachel Rosenbloom, Human Rights
Fellow & Supervising Att’y, Ctr. for Human Rights & Int’l Justice at Boston Coll.) (“It is not uncommon
for someone who is mentally ill and suffering from delusions to state that he or she was born abroad.”).
234. Jacqueline Stevens, Thin ICE, The Nation (June 5, 2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/thinice.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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known to suffer from delusions, even the involvement of an attorney may
not have helped.
In other cases, U.S. citizens have been deported based on conflicting
statements about their place of birth. For example, Mark Lyttle, a U.S.
citizen with bipolar disorder and a learning disability, had sworn to
immigration agents on two occasions that he was Mexican, but he had
240
also sworn that he was born in North Carolina. He endured a horrific
ordeal after ICE deemed him an undocumented immigrant from
241
Mexico. Although ICE had substantial evidence of Lyttle’s citizenship,
including criminal record checks that indicated he was a citizen, ICE
detained him for fifty-one days and placed him in removal proceedings,
where he was forced to represent himself and ultimately ordered
242
deported. He spent four months wandering through Mexico and Central
America homeless, and was even briefly jailed in Honduras, before he
finally found a U.S. consular officer in Guatemala who contacted his
family, realized that he was a U.S. citizen, and helped him return to the
243
United States. But what if Lyttle could not communicate that he was
born in North Carolina and adopted? What if he did not have family
members who could confirm his citizenship? Even if he had been
appointed a lawyer during his removal proceeding, that lawyer might not
have discovered that he is actually a U.S. citizen.
Another example is Gustavo S., a native English speaker with
schizophrenia who was charged with illegal entry based solely on his
244
statement that he was born in Honduras. Gustavo, like Lyttle, gave
inconsistent accounts of his place of birth to ICE as well as to his
245
attorney.
Although the immigration judge disregarded Guastavo’s
statement as unreliable in light of his mental disabilities, ICE nevertheless
detained him for nineteen months based solely on his statement regarding
his place of birth and ultimately deported him to Honduras after acquiring
a travel document from the General Consul of Honduras using the
246
information provided by DHS. Here, even the presence of an attorney
did not prevent the erroneous deportation. These cases highlight
situations in which the respondent’s incompetence undermines accurate
decisions about deportability. An attorney who cannot access crucial

240. Kristin Collins, N.C. Native Wrongly Deported To Mexico, Charlotte Observer (Aug. 30,
2009), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2009/08/30/917007/nc-native-wrongly-deported-to.html.
241. See id.; see also Esha Bhandari, Yes, the U.S. Wrongfully Deports Its Own Citizens, ACLU
(Apr. 25, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/yes-us-wrongfully-deports-itsown-citizens; William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine: Annals of Immigration, New Yorker,
Apr. 29, 2013, at 24.
242. Collins, supra note 240.
243. Bhandari, supra note 241.
244. Deportation by Default, supra note 7, at 45.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 46.
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facts because of the client’s incompetence can do little to help protect the
fairness and accuracy of the proceedings.
B. Safeguarding Statutory and Constitutional Rights
In addition to protecting the accuracy and reliability of the
proceedings, a right to competence would safeguard other rights
established by statute or required by procedural due process. As in
criminal cases, where the Sixth Amendment provides that “the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the
247
accusation” and “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” the
INA gives certain rights directly to the noncitizen facing deportation. The
INA guarantees that “the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against the alien, to present evidence on the alien’s
own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the
248
Government.” In both cases, these rights are given directly to the
individual whose liberty is at stake, but incompetence undermines the
ability to exercise these rights.
The emerging right to appointed counsel for incompetent detainees
would add to the bundle of rights mentioned above. By definition,
however, an incompetent individual does not have the ability to assist
counsel and therefore cannot effectively exercise the right to counsel.
Nor can counsel handle the case without the respondent’s participation. As
discussed above, respondents play an active role in removal proceedings.
Their input and cooperation is necessary in obtaining relevant facts,
identifying witnesses, and providing testimony. Thus, the nature of the
proceeding is nothing like habeas, where the attorney can carry the case
249
alone. An incompetent immigrant who lacks the ability to communicate
relevant information to either counsel or the court simply cannot exercise
the rights guaranteed by the INA and Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause.

247. U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added).
248. See INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2014) (emphasis added); see also Saidane v. INS,
129 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he government must . . . afford the alien a reasonable
opportunity to confront the witnesses against him or her.” (emphasis added)). As Justice Frankfurter
explained in discussing the common law right of allocution, even the “modern innovation[]” of a right
to counsel in criminal proceedings does not “lessen[] the need for the defendant, personally, to have
the opportunity to present to the court his plea in mitigation,” because “[t]he most persuasive counsel
may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for
himself.” Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion).
249. See Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 705 (2013).
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C. Upholding the Prohibition Against Proceeding in Absentia
Deporting incompetent respondents also conflicts with the general
250
prohibition against conducting removal proceedings in absentia. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Drope, “the mentally incompetent
defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality
251
afforded no opportunity to defend himself.” Likewise, an incompetent
respondent may be physically present but is absent from the hearing for
all practical purposes. The INA provides that a hearing may take place
252
“in the absence of the alien” only “when agreed to by the parties.”
Moreover, the INA gives the respondent the right to “cross-examine
witnesses,” much like the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause,
which is the primary basis for the prohibition against in absentia trials of
253
criminal defendants. The statutory requirements to proper notice of
the time and place of the hearing, as well as the requirement to give
notice of the consequences for failure to appear, all underscore the right
254
to be present. In fact, the BIA has repeatedly held that an immigration
judge “has no authority to order an alien’s removal from the United
States in absentia unless the alien has received (or can be properly
charged with receiving), at his last provided address, the . . . warnings and
255
advisals contained in the Notice to Appear.”
If the respondent receives proper notice and nevertheless fails to
appear, she may be ordered deported in absentia because the absence is
considered consensual in this situation, but the same is true in many

250. This prohibition stems not only from the INA, see infra notes 252–254, 256, but also from basic
principles of due process. The Supreme Court has held that the right to appear attaches in various civil
contexts where a liberty interest is at stake. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) (extending
the right to an oral hearing to social security overpayment recoupment proceedings); Morrisey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972) (applying a right to be present in a parole revocation hearing); Specht v. Patterson,
386 U.S. 605 (1967) (holding that the right to be present exists in civil commitment proceedings).
251. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (quoting Foote, supra note 54); see also
McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 951–52 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Drope and Foote, supra note 54);
Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 171); Eddmonds v.
Peters, 93 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 172; Foote, supra note 54, at
834); Stone v. United States, 358 F.2d 503, 507 n.5 (9th Cir. 1966) (quoting Foote, supra note 54, at
834).
252. The INA provides that the proceeding may take place: “(i) in person, (ii)where agreed to by
the parties, in the absence of the alien, (iii) through video conference, or (iv) subject to subparagraph
(B), through telephone conference.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(A) (2014). For the proceeding to take
place by telephone, the alien must have been advised of the right to proceed in person or through
video conference and must consent to the telephone conference. Id. § 1229a(b)(2)(B).
253. See INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
254. See INA § 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
255. In re Jorge Anyelo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 337, 339 (B.I.A. 2010); see In re G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec.
181, 187 (B.I.A. 2001).
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256

criminal proceedings. State criminal courts routinely construe the
failure to show up for trial as a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right
257
to be present and conduct the trial in the defendant’s absence. Federal
courts are more constrained in this matter, as they must abide by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c), which permits an in absentia trial only
if the defendant was present at trial initially or had pleaded guilty or nolo
258
contendere. The Supreme Court confirmed in Crosby v. United States
that a defendant’s initial presence is required for an in absentia trial
259
under Rule 43. The Sixth Amendment, however, does not require this
initial presence. In other words, as the Second Circuit has explained,
“nothing in the Constitution prohibits a trial from being commenced in the
defendant’s absence so long as the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
260
waives his right to be present.” Accordingly, state courts are free to
proceed with a trial if the defendant was properly notified and never
showed up, as long as “the requisite knowledge can be conclusively
261
found” based on the record. The constitutional prohibition against in
absentia trials is therefore no more absolute than the INA provision:
both permit a waiver of the right to be present. Mentally incompetent
individuals, however, do not have the capacity to waive the right to be
present in a criminal case or to “consent” to an in absentia removal
262
hearing under the INA.
The following statutory provision adds a layer of complexity to this
analysis: “If it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental incompetency
for the alien to be present at the proceeding, the Attorney General shall
263
prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and privileges of the alien.”
256. See INA § 240(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (stating that an alien who fails to appear after
receiving proper notice may be ordered removed in absentia if DHS “establishes by clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence that the written notice was so provided and that the alien is removable”).
257. Pennsylvania, for example, allows fugitive defendants to be tried in absentia, and some judges
do this “routinely.” See Walter M. Phillips, Jr., Report of Subcommittee on Trying Fugitive
Defendants in Absentia 10 (discussing the practices in Pennsylvania). Some states, but not all,
require an on-the-record colloquy prior to finding waiver of the right to be present, which is similar to
the oral warnings given by immigration judges (unless waived by the respondent’s attorney) and set
forth in writing on the Notice to Appear. See id. at 10; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.180 (allowing an in
absentia trial if the defendant is voluntarily absent, even in capital cases); Peede v. State, 474 So.2d 808
(Fla. 1985) (upholding the in absentia trial of a defendant accused of murder).
258. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c).
259. Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 261 (1993). Some federal courts have since found that
technical violations of Rule 43 resulted only in “harmless errors.” See, e.g., United States v. Benabe,
654 F.3d 753, 761 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the court’s error in barring the defendants from trial on
the day before trial, rather than on the first morning of trial, in violation of Rule 43, was “harmless”).
260. Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 884 (1999).
261. Id. at 76. Smith claimed that he missed the trial because he overslept, but the Second Circuit
noted that he made no attempt to contact the court and thereafter remained a fugitive. Id. at 77. By
declining certiorari in Smith, the Supreme Court implicitly agreed with the Second Circuit’s analysis.
262. Waiver of a constitutional right must also be “competent” and “intelligent” under Supreme
Court precedents. See infra note 303.
263. INA § 240(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2014).
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While this statutory provision does not explicitly prohibit removal
proceedings if the respondent is incompetent, it indicates that Congress
was aware of a potential problem related to in absentia hearings for
mentally incompetent respondents. Since no safeguards have been
prescribed, the provision is of limited practical use, and the best approach
is to read it together with the other statutory provisions cited above. The
INA’s prohibition against proceeding “in the absence of the alien,” unless
the respondent gives consent, does not include any exceptions, so that
prohibition should be interpreted as applying to mentally incompetent
264
individuals as well. Relying on that prohibition, courts could conclude
that it is not possible to pursue removal when the respondent is
incompetent.
D. Protecting the Dignity of the Individual and the Legal Process
Courts and commentators alike have identified the preservation of
dignity as one of the reasons underlying the prohibition against subjecting
an incompetent defendant to trial. This concept of dignity has different
aspects. First, the defendant herself may be stripped of dignity by being
transformed into a “spectacle,” especially if she is attempting to conduct
265
her own defense. Second, the legal proceeding in which such a
266
spectacle occurs appears undignified and unfair. Third, the legal process
loses dignity by becoming unhinged from the purposes of punishment,
such as deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. Criminal prosecution
does not serve these purposes when a defendant cannot comprehend the
alleged wrongdoing, understand the nature of the proceedings, or grasp
267
why she is being punished.
Although deportation is not technically “punishment,” the Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that it is a very severe penalty that is
268
closely related to criminal punishment.
In fact, the Court has
acknowledged that it is often “the most important part . . . of the penalty
that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to
269
specified crimes.” Many noncitizens would prefer a temporary jail

264. INA § 240(b)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2)(B).
265. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
266. See id. (stating that criminal “proceedings must not only be fair, they must ‘appear fair to all
who observe them’” (citations omitted)); Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 658, 658 n.2 (4th Cir.
1969) (“[T]he idea of sentencing an insane person to prison remains offensive and is incompatible with
the dignity of the judicial process.”) (citing Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for
Felony, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 831 (1968)).
267. See, e.g., Dillard, supra note 90, at 470–71; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of the
Insanity Plea—Clues To the Problems of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the Death Cell,
73 Yale L.J. 425, 433–41 (1964); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 401, 404–06 (1958).
268. See supra note 3.
269. Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356, 364 (2010).
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sentence to permanent exile. Subjecting incompetent individuals to
deportation when they may not understand the meaning of legal status or
comprehend why they are being separated from their families and forced
to leave the country raises the same moral questions and poses the same
threat to dignity as punishing incompetent defendants.
Moreover the same threat to the appearance of fairness exists in the
deportation context because removal proceedings are intensely adversarial
270
and have many of the trappings of criminal trials. Among other aspects,
the government files the charging document, formal notice must be given
to the respondent, the functions of the trial attorney and immigration
judge are equivalent to the functions of the prosecutor and judge in a
criminal proceeding, and the respondent may be detained during the
271
proceedings. Differences do exist between removal proceedings and
criminal proceedings, of course, but these differences reflect the greater
protections that criminal defendants receive. Their absence from removal
proceedings therefore only amplifies the appearance of unfairness. For
example, the fact that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination does not apply in removal proceedings makes it even more
likely that the removal proceeding against an incompetent respondent
will appear undignified and unfair, and the lower burden of proof, which
facilitates deportation, only highlights the imbalance of power between
272
the parties. Recognizing a substantive right to competence in removal
proceedings would therefore help preserve the moral dignity of the
removal process and the appearance of fairness.
E. Removal as an Extension of the Criminal Process
Not only do removal proceedings have the same trappings as criminal
trials, but immigration enforcement has become inextricably intertwined
273
with criminal enforcement. As Ingrid V. Eagly explains, this comingling
of criminal and immigration enforcement begins at the early, investigatory
stages of the criminal process and extends to decisions made during
270. See Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1024 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that removal
proceedings closely resemble a trial and “are adversarial and employ many of the same procedures
used in Article III courts”); Frango v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2006) (same); Etchu-Njang
v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577, 583 (8th Cir. 2005) (contrasting “adversarial” removal proceedings with
“inquisitorial” Social Security benefit proceedings); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 699
(6th Cir. 2002) (“It is clear that removal proceedings are decidedly adversarial.”).
271. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (service of Notice to Appear); id. § 1229a (role of immigration judge and
conduct of removal proceedings); id. § 1226 (detention).
272. The Supreme Court has also noted that removal proceedings “look[] prospectively to the
respondent’s right to remain in this country,” whereas criminal proceedings seek to punish past acts;
the government must show only identity and alienage, and the burden then shifts to respondent to
prove time, place, and manner of entry; Miranda warnings are not required; the Ex Post Facto Clause
does not apply; and the Eighth Amendment does not require bail to be granted in certain cases. See
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
273. See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 9, at 1143–56.
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booking, pretrial release, plea-bargaining and sentencing. State and local
officials involved in the criminal process are attuned to defendants’
immigration status and the conviction-driven system of immigration
enforcement, while, at the same time, federal immigration agents are
275
embedded in local law enforcement systems. Eagly observes that “the
growing centrality of criminality to immigration enforcement is one of
276
the most significant historical shifts in the federal immigration system.”
The integrated nature of immigration and criminal enforcement
calls for a consistent approach to questions of competence during these
processes. In the criminal context, the law is clear that a defendant must
277
be competent at all stages of the prosecution. The right to competence
therefore extends all the way to sentencing. Competence during the
penalty phase is particularly important because it represents the moment
“when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce whether it
278
will deprive . . . [someone] of liberty.” Pronouncing the sentence when
the defendant is incompetent is akin to sentencing someone in absentia
and “shows a lack of fundamental respect for the dignity” of the
279
defendant. Ensuring the defendant’s presence and competence at
sentencing simply “enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both
280
sentence and conviction.” In this respect, the right to competence has
an especially long reach; other rights, such as the right to a jury trial and
the right to be confronted with witnesses, do not extend to the sentencing
281
phase.
The question then becomes, precisely when does the right to
competence end? Since there is no dispute that it extends to the penalty
274. Id. at 1147–56.
275. Id. at 1134.
276. Id. at 1129.
277. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975) (“Even when a defendant is competent at the
commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that
would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.”); United States
v. Rickert, 685 F.3d 760, 765 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[A] defendant must be competent at all stages of the
prosecution, including sentencing.”); United States v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“Whether the defendant is competent is an ongoing inquiry; the defendant must be competent at all
stages of trial.”); United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 921, 924 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[U]nquestionably, ‘the
need for competency extends beyond the trial to the sentencing phase of a proceeding.’”) (quoting
United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1115 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 905 (1990)); United
States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1544 (1st Cir. 1989) (“The need for competency survives trial and
extends through the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding.”); Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653,
658, 658 n.2 (4th Cir.) (finding that an incompetent defendant may not be “effectively present” at
sentencing and that passing sentence under such conditions might violate due process), cert. denied
396 U.S. 970 (1969); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(1)(A), (C).
278. Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 831 (1968).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462–63 (1984) (holding that the right to jury trial does not
apply at sentencing); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (holding that the sentencing judge
may consider reports of probation officers and psychiatrists without affording any cross-examination).
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phase, the issue may be reframed as whether deportation is also part of
that penalty phase. The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla suggests that
it is. In addition to describing deportation as “an integral part . . . of the
282
penalty” that results from a conviction, Padilla went on to explain:
Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is
nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has
enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for
nearly a century. And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration
law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of
noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it “most difficult” to divorce the
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. . . .
Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because
of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to
283
classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.

In concluding that deportation is “not categorically removed from
284
the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,” the Court
recognized that there is no bright line between the criminal sentence and
the deportation that routinely follows. The erosion of the boundary
between these two penalty phases creates room for courts to find that the
right to competence should span both proceedings. Even in cases in
which the criminal process does not reach the penalty phase, however,
the interlocking nature of criminal and immigration enforcement
supports extending the right to competence to removal proceedings.

V. Potential Concerns with a Right to Competence in Removal
Proceedings
While a substantive right to competence could prevent many forms of
injustice, it also has some potential drawbacks. First, it may open the door
to indefinite civil commitment. As criminal defense lawyers are well aware,
a finding of incompetence may result in a long period of civil commitment
285
when a guilty plea would have led to a much shorter jail sentence.
Second, recognizing a right to competence in removal proceedings may
mean that an incompetent individual would be forced to forfeit a chance at
being granted legal status by the immigration judge. There is no analog for
this concern in the criminal context because defendants cannot gain any
benefits through the criminal system; at best they can preserve the status
quo. This Part explores both of these issues and suggests that these
concerns may not be as significant as they initially appear.

282.
283.
284.
285.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356, 364 (2010).
Id. at 365–66 (citations omitted).
Id. at 366.
See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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A. The Risk of Indefinite Civil Commitment
As noted above, if a criminal defendant is not competent and will not
become competent in the foreseeable future, the state must either initiate
civil commitment proceedings or release the defendant and dismiss the
286
charges. Defense attorneys would often prefer to avoid the risk of civil
commitment by opting not to raise the issue of competency and accepting
a conviction that will result in a relatively short sentence or perhaps just
287
a fine. Various scholars have debated whether defense attorneys may
legally and ethically make these types of strategic decisions about whether
288
to raise competency. Some have argued that defense attorneys should
be able to “waive” the right to competence, although the waiver of a
constitutional right must normally be made “competently and
289
intelligently.” These debates reflect the gravity of the threat of civil
commitment in the criminal context. In the immigration context, however,
the threat may not be as significant. There are at least two reasons why
this would be true. First, many noncitizens in removal proceedings would
not meet the standard for civil commitment, which requires a finding of
dangerousness. Second, neither immigration judges nor DHS are currently
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., Dillard, supra note 90, at 465–66.
288. The American Bar Association (“ABA”) standard provides that defense attorneys must raise
the issue of incompetence whenever they have a “good faith doubt” that the defendant is competent to
stand trial, but scholars have argued that attorneys may legally and ethically act more strategically in
deciding whether to raise the issue. See, e.g., Albert J. Diaz et al., ABA Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards 7-4.2(c) (“Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the defendant’s
competence to stand trial whenever the defense counsel has a good faith doubt as to the defendant’s
competence.”). But see Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing
the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 65, 67
(proposing that defense attorneys make case-by-case determinations regarding whether to raise
competency concerns); Bonnie, supra note 58, at 564–65 (arguing that “procedural due process does
not always require the defense attorney to bring her doubts about a defendant’s competence to
judicial attention”); John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution of Judgment: Ethics and the
Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 207, 235 (2008) (arguing that the ABA standard is
“outrageous” and “not justified by history, necessity, or logic and undermines the integrity of the
attorney-client relationship and, therefore, the integrity of the criminal justice system”); Dillard, supra
note 90, at 465–66 (explaining that the category of “marginally competent defendants” creates room to
confront the determinate criminal justice system rather than face indefinite civil commitment).
289. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (holding that a criminal defendant may not
waive right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so “competently and intelligently”); Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966) (“[I]t is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be
incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have the court determine his
capacity to stand trial.”); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (“A finding that a defendant is
competent to stand trial . . . is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to plead guilty or
waive his right to counsel. In addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or
waive counsel is competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is
knowing and voluntary.”). But see Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial,
32 UCLA L. Rev. 921, 959 (1985) (arguing that the defendant or defense counsel should be able to
waive competency). Richard Bonnies criticized Winick’s waiver argument as inconsistent with the
Constitution and the interests of society. See Bonnie, supra note 58, at 542–48.
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authorized to initiate civil commitment proceedings. This Subpart
discusses each of these reasons in detail.
1. The Assessment of Dangerousness
The standard for civil commitment in most states requires showing,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual poses a danger to
290
self or others and that the danger is in the near future. While the
Supreme Court has never held that a finding of dangerousness is
constitutionally required for civil commitment, it has explained that the
291
mere presence of mental illness is not enough. In the case of an
incompetent defendant, the criminal charges that led to the initiation of
civil commitment proceedings impact the assessment of dangerousness,
even though the defendant was never convicted. Empirical research
confirms that perceived criminal status affects how hospitals assess and
292
treat patients. Therefore, immigration lawyers representing mentally
incompetent individuals with criminal records have good reason to be
concerned about the risk of civil commitment. Currently, about half of
the individuals subject to an ICE detainer have a criminal conviction, and
fourteen percent are identified as posing a serious threat to public safety
293
or national security. If one removes from the analysis traffic violations
and marijuana possession, which are likely to be viewed as nondangerous crimes, two-thirds of detainers involve individuals with no
294
criminal record. Thus, many noncitizens, but far from all, will have a
criminal record that clouds any assessment of dangerousness.
290. Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency To Make Medical Treatment Decisions
and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 561, 567 (2012) (tracing the history of
the dangerousness requirement for civil commitment); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)
(holding that the burden of proof for civil commitment is “clear and convincing evidence,” which is an
intermediate standard between “beyond a reasonable doubt” and “a preponderance of the evidence”).
291. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“[T]here is . . . no constitutional basis for
confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.”).
The court did not decide “whether the State may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill
individual for the purpose of treatment.” Id. at 573.
292. One study found that “forensic patients” (those who have been accused of crimes) spend four
times as long in the hospital as “civil patients” and that the length of the hospitalization corresponds to
the seriousness of the alleged crime. Robert D. Miller et al., Judicial Oversight of Release of Patients
Committed After Being Found Not Competent To Stand Trial or Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity in
Violent Crimes, 28 J. Forensic Sci. 839, 842 (1983). Another study found that individuals whose
criminal charges had been dismissed based on a finding that they were not competent and not
restorable to competency were treated differently for purposes of civil commitment than other
members of the community whose conditions had simply deteriorated to the point of being committed.
Gwen A. Levitt et al., Civil Commitment Outcomes of Incompetent Defendants, 38 J. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry & L. 349, 357 (2010).
293. Few ICE Detainers Target Serious Criminals, TRAC (Sept. 17, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/330 (reporting on data from ICE for FY 2012 and the first four months of FY
2013).
294. Id. TRAC further reports that in Fiscal Year 2013, about fourteen percent of deportation
filings were based on alleged criminal activity, but the fact that ICE did not charge a criminal ground
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Of course, even those without a criminal record may be perceived as
dangerous simply because of their mental illness. Numerous studies have
shown that mentally ill individuals are stigmatized as dangerous, with
factors such as the individual’s race, age, and education affecting people’s
295
perceptions of danger. The evidence regarding whether the mentally ill
are actually more violent than members of the general population is
mixed, but the consensus seems to be that there is a modest but statistically
296
significant relationship between severe mental illness and violence.
Some studies have found that the relationship between mental illness and
violence disappears when one takes into account substance abuse as a
compounding factor, while other studies indicate that substance abuse
only makes the relationship between severe mental illness and violence
297
stronger.
Factors such as a history of violent victimization and

in other cases does not mean the respondents in those cases had no criminal history; ICE does not
need to charge a criminal ground if the person is otherwise removable. See U.S. Deportation
Proceedings in Immigration Courts, TRAC, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/
deport_filing_charge.php (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (search “Fiscal Year” “2013” and “2014”).
295. Nava R. Silton et al., Stigma in America: Has Anything Changed?: Impact of Perceptions of
Mental Illness and Dangerousness on the Desire for Social Distance: 1996 and 2006, 199 J. Nervous &
Mental Disease 361, 365 (2011) (finding, inter alia, that race, education, age, and religious practices
affect perceptions of dangerousness). See Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness:
Labels, Causes, Dangerousness and Social Distance, 89 Am. J. Pub. Health 1328, 1330–31 (1999);
Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., The Public’s View of the Competence, Dangerousness, and Need for
Legal Coercion of Persons with Mental Health Problems, 89 Am. J. Pub. Health 1339, 1342 (1999);
Richard A. Van Dorn et al., A Comparison of Stigmatizing Attitudes Towards Persons with Schizophrenia
in Four Stakeholder Groups: Perceived Likelihood of Violence and Desire for Social Distance,
68 Psychiatry: Interpersonal & Biological Processes 152, 154 (2005); M.C. Angermeyer et al.,
Mental Disorder and Violence: Results of Epidemiological Studies in the Era of De-institutionalization,
33 Soc. Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology S1, S4 (1998). See generally J.C. Phelan & B.G. Link,
The Growing Belief that People with Mental Illness Are Violent: The Role of the Dangerousness
Criterion for Civil Commitment, 33 Soc. Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology S7 (1998) (discussing
the possibility that the adoption of the dangerousness criterion for civil commitment may have had the
unintended consequence of increasing the stigma of mental illness in the United States).
296. See, e.g., Richard Van Dorn et al., Mental Disorder and Violence: Is There a Relationship
Beyond Substance Use?, 47 Soc. Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology 487, 487 (2011) (stating that
the consensus indicates “a modest, yet statistically significant relationship between severe mental
illness . . . and violence”); Arthur J. Lurigio & Andrew J. Harris, Mental Illness, Violence, and Risk
Assessment: An Evidence-Based Review, 4 Victims & Offenders 341, 344 (2009) (finding that the best
designed and most statistically sophisticated studies show a modest relationship between severe
mental illness and violence).
297. See Eric B. Elbogen & Sally C. Johnson, The Intricate Link Between Violence and Mental
Disorder: Results from the National Epidemiologoical Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions,
66 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 152, 155 (2009) (finding that serious mental illness was statistically
unrelated to community violence unless comorbid substance abuse or dependence was involved);
Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., The Social-Environmental Context of Violent Behavior in Persons Treated
for Severe Mental Illness, 92 Am. J. Pub. Health 1523, 1529 (2002) (finding that people with mental
illness who had no other risk factors for violence, such as substance use, were no more likely to engage
in assaultive acts than members of the general population). But see Van Dorn et al., supra note 296, at
501 (finding that substance abuse makes the relationship between severe mental illness and violence
even stronger).
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exposure to community violence have also been found to affect
298
propensity for violence among the mentally ill. There is no dispute,
however, that “most people with mental illness are not violent, [and] that
299
most violent acts are committed by people who are not mentally ill.”
The research mentioned above provides several important lessons
for immigration lawyers concerned about the possibility of civil
commitment. First, if the respondent has been charged or convicted of a
crime, especially a violent crime, the immigration lawyer should think
carefully about how to approach questions of competency—much like a
criminal defense lawyer. The risk of a dangerousness finding is likely
reduced when the respondent has no criminal history. The lawyer must
still consider, however, whether the client is likely to be considered a
danger to self or others based on the client’s particular mental disability
and any compounding factors that may be present. The importance of
these specific, contextualizing factors should not be underestimated. In
some cases, the client may struggle with a mental illness or cognitive
deficiencies that create no risk of dangerous behavior, while other cases
will call for much more caution.
2. The Limited Powers of Immigration Judges
In addition, civil commitment is a more remote possibility in the
removal context than the criminal context because the statutory powers
of immigration judges differ from the powers of state court judges. Many
state statutes require the court, district attorney, or medical institution to
initiate involuntary commitment proceedings if the defendant is found
incompetent and cannot be restored to competency within a reasonable
300
period of time. In fact, state statues often authorize the same judge
who found the defendant incompetent to determine whether that
defendant poses a danger to self or others for purposes of civil
301
commitment.

298. Swanson et al., supra note 297, at 1528–29.
299. Van Dorn et al., supra note 296, at 487.
300. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 504.110 (LexisNexis 2008) (providing that if a defendant is
found incompetent to stand trial, the court “shall conduct an involuntary hospitalization proceeding”
and, if there is a substantial probability that the defendant will gain competency in the foreseeable
future, the court “shall commit” the defendant to a treatment facility for sixty days); W. Va. Code
Ann. § 27-6A-3(a) (1999) (“The court shall commit such defendant to a mental health facility under
the jurisdiction of the department of health”); Ind. Code § 35-36-3-3(b) (2013) (“If a substantial
probability [of restoring competency] does not exist, the state institution . . . or the third party
contractor shall initiate regular commitment proceedings.”). Some states require initiation of civil
proceedings only for certain enumerated crimes. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-1.6(C) (1978)
(dealing with commitment due to mental retardation); see also Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G.
Gutheil, Clinical Handbook of Psychiatry and the Law 137 (4th ed. 2007) (reviewing state
commitment statutes).
301. See Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 300.
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Immigration judges, on the other hand, have no such power.
Immigration judges only have the authority delegated to them by the
302
Attorney General. The limited matters over which they have jurisdiction
303
are carefully delineated in the regulations. These regulations provide
that an immigration judge may determine removability, adjudicate certain
applications for relief from removal, and, where appropriate, order
withholding of removal under the INA or the Convention Against
304
Torture. Insofar as the regulations state that an immigration judge may
also “take any other action consistent with applicable law and regulations
as may be appropriate,” the judge is still limited to matters over which
305
she has been granted jurisdiction by the statute or regulations. Thus,
nothing in the regulations currently gives an immigration judge the
authority to order an agency to initiate civil commitment proceedings.
The BIA has narrowly construed an immigration judge’s regulatory
grant of powers, finding, for example, that an immigration judge does not
306
have authority to order discovery,
cannot adjudicate a type of
307
application not specifically named in the regulations, and cannot
review DHS’s decision to commence removal proceedings against a
308
given individual. Given that the INA and regulations make no mention
of any authority to initiate a totally separate type of proceeding, such as
civil commitment proceedings, that action would lie far outside the scope
of an immigration judge’s delegated powers.
Similarly, nothing in the statute or regulations gives DHS the
authority to initiate civil commitment proceedings. The regulations give
302. In re Fede, 20 I. & N. Dec. 35, 35–36 (B.I.A. 1989) (“The Board and immigration judges . . .
only have such authority as is created and delegated by the Attorney General.”).
303. See Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.1(a)(1) (2013) (describing the matters over which an immigration judge has jurisdiction);
Executive Office for Immigration Review Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2013) (describing the matters
over which the BIA has appellate jurisdiction); see also In re Hernandez-Puente, 20 I. & N. Dec. 335,
339 (B.I.A. 1991) (stating that immigration judges “have no jurisdiction unless it is affirmatively
granted by the regulations”); In re Sano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 299, 300–01 (B.I.A. 1985); In re Zaidan, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 297, 298 (B.I.A. 1985).
304. Executive Office for Immigration Review Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a)(1); In re HernandezPuente, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 339.
305. See Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.1(a)(1)(iv). An immigration judge could not, therefore, take action based on another source of
law outside the INA and its regulations. See, e.g., Padilla-Padilla v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 972, 977 (9th
Cir. 2006) (finding that an immigration judge did not have jurisdiction over questions of customary
international law).
306. In re Henriquez Rivera, 25 I. & N. Dec. 575, 579 (B.I.A. 2011) (holding that the immigration
judge erred in ordering DHS to provide the Immigration Court with an applicant’s complete
administrative record from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)).
307. In re Hernandez-Puente, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 339.
308. DHS is given sole authority to determine whether to commence proceedings under the INA.
See In re Lujan-Quintana, 25 I. & N. Dec. 53, 56 (B.I.A. 2009); In re G-N-C-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 281, 284
(B.I.A. 1998) (“[T]he decision to institute deportation proceedings involves the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion and is not a decision which the Immigration Judge or the Board may review.”).
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DHS only the power to “present on behalf of the government evidence
material to the issues of deportability or inadmissibility and any other
309
issues that may require disposition by the immigration judge.” DHS, like
any other administrative agency, is limited to enforcement of its statute.
Agency action outside statutory limits is considered ultra vires and
310
invalid. Initiating civil commitment proceedings has nothing to do with
enforcement of the INA and bears no relevance to issues of deportability
and inadmissibility. As a practical matter, DHS also has limited financial
resources. Because DHS does not even have the resources to pursue
removal proceedings against everyone who lacks legal status, initiating
an entirely different type of proceeding unrelated to immigration seems
311
out of the question. For all of these reasons, civil commitment poses
312
less of a threat in the removal context than the criminal context.
Although mentally incompetent individuals could be subject to
regular immigration detention while their competence is being evaluated
or while attempts are made to restore competence, the new DHS policy
discussed above purports to prevent prolonged detention of these
313
individuals by giving them the right to a bond hearing after six months.
Moreover, at least one federal appellate court—the Ninth Circuit—has
curtailed the risk of prolonged detention by taking the more sweeping
step of holding that detainees subject to mandatory detention and those
classified as arriving aliens, over whom immigration courts traditionally
had no bond jurisdiction, must be given a bond hearing after six months
314
of detention.

309. Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(a).
310. Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 322 (1961) (“[T]he determinative
question is not what the [agency] thinks it should do but what Congress has said it can do.”); id. at 328
(finding that a federal agency cannot “do indirectly what it cannot do directly”); Gibas v. Saginaw
Mining Co., 748 F.2d 1112, 1117 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[A]dministrative agencies are vested only with the
authority given to them by Congress.”).
311. The cost of civil commitment often exceeds the cost of criminal incarceration due to the need
for higher numbers of staff and more medical care. For example, a study showed that the cost of civil
commitment in Minnesota is $120,000 per year for a sex offender, which is three times the cost of
criminal incarceration. Office of the Legislative Auditor, State of Minn., Civil Commitment of Sex
Offenders x (2011), available at http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/ccso.pdf. The annual
cost of civil commitment programs in other states with secure facilities range from around $36,000 to
$180,000 per year. Id.
312. It is, of course, possible that Congress could amend the INA to grant immigration judges or
DHS the power to initiate civil commitment proceedings. Given how thinly resources are stretched
within these agencies, however, it seems unlikely that Congress would be able to add this task, which is
unrelated to immigration enforcement, to their workload.
313. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 5.
314. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013).
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B. Forfeiting the Chance to Gain Legal Status
In a subset of cases, immigration lawyers may want to proceed
despite a client’s incompetence because they believe that the client is
eligible for some form of relief and has a strong chance of being granted
legal status. There are certain applications for relief that can only be
granted in removal proceedings, such as various forms of cancellation of
315
removal, which lead to lawful permanent residence. Moreover, if the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has
decided not to grant an affirmative asylum application, the immigration
316
court obtains jurisdiction over the application. If the judge grants
asylum, the respondent becomes eligible to apply for lawful permanent
317
residence one year later. Applications for withholding of removal and
protection under the Convention Against Torture may be adjudicated
318
only by the immigration court. While these forms of relief do not lead
to lawful permanent residence, they do allow people to live and work
319
legally in the United States.
Attorneys who believe a case is so strong that they can win it despite
the client’s incompetence may not want the case to be terminated.
Perhaps the country conditions are so horrific, the corroborating
evidence so overwhelming, and the expert testimonies so persuasive that
the lawyer feels confident that the respondent will prevail even if she
does not testify or testifies poorly. Such cases may be rare but are
certainly conceivable. For example, a survivor of genocide might prevail
with little testimony, even if she is mentally incompetent. Recognizing a
substantive right to competence need not, however, result in forfeiting
relief. The unique nature of immigration proceedings, which expose the
respondent to deportation yet also provide an opportunity to obtain legal
status, requires a contextualized understanding of the right to competence.

315. See Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.1(a)(ii) (2013) (providing that the immigration judge shall have authority to determine
applications under sections 240A(a) and (b) of the INA, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(a)–
(b), which pertain to cancellation of removal). The statutory language in section 1229(b)(a) and (b)
provides that the “Attorney General may cancel removal” for certain individuals. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1229b(a)–(b) (2012). Congress delegated primary authority to administer the INA to the Attorney
General, who, in turn, delegated that authority to various agencies within the Department of Justice,
including the EOIR. The EOIR is composed of the Immigration Courts and the BIA. See Stephen H.
Legomsky & Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 3 (5th ed. 2009).
316. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(ii); Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal Rule,
8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(b) (2013); see also Obtaining Asylum in the United States, USCIS (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (describing
the affirmative and defensive application processes).
317. Adjustment of Status of refugees and Aliens Granted Asylum Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1209.2(a) (2013).
318. Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.1(a)(iii); Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal Rule, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(a),
1208.17 (2013).
319. Control of Employment of Aliens Rule, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1274a.12(a)(10), (c)(8), (c)(18) (2009).
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This contextualized understanding calls for bifurcating the issue of
deportation from applications for relief or, at a minimum, paying close
attention to the level of participation actually needed in a particular case,
as well as the attorney’s judgment about the client’s ability to assist, when
making competency determinations.
1. Bifurcating Deportation from Applications for Relief
The basic purpose of recognizing a substantive due process right to
competence is to prevent an incompetent individual from being deported
erroneously and unfairly, while also preserving the dignity of the removal
320
process. These reasons support a substantive right not to be deported
while incompetent, but should not rule out being able to apply for legal
status. The process of pursuing an application such as asylum or
cancellation of removal does not raise questions about the respondent’s
moral understanding of wrongdoing and penalization. Moreover, the risk
associated with an error is minimal because entry of a deportation order
would still be prohibited if the application were denied. In other words, a
denial would simply maintain the status quo.
Permitting an incompetent individual to pursue an application in
immigration court does not really differ from allowing an incompetent
individual to be a litigant in an ordinary civil case. Once deportation is
off the table, the case loses its quasi-criminal component. Just as an
incompetent individual can pursue a civil claim with an attorney, next
friend, or guardian ad litem under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c),
an incompetent individual should be permitted to pursue an application
in immigration court with similar procedural due process protections.
This type of bifurcated analysis should apply where the application can
only be granted by the immigration court and not by UCSIS if the removal
proceeding is terminated. As noted above, cancellation of removal, asylum
(if USCIS has already made a determination), withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture exemplify these types of
321
applications. Applications such as adjustment of status (the process of
becoming a permanent resident), which could be filed with USCIS after
the removal proceeding is terminated, would not require a bifurcated
322
hearing. The removal proceeding would simply be terminated based on

320. See Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 8, at 458; Bonnie, supra note 58, at 543.
321. See supra notes 317–318 and accompanying text; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(a) (stating that,
with one exception, asylum officers shall not consider applications for withholding of removal, which
must be decided by an immigration judge); id. § 208.16(b) (stating that individuals in removal
proceedings may seek protection under the Convention Against Torture).
322. The immigration court has jurisdiction over an adjustment application when the applicant is
in removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R.§ 1245.2(a) (2014). Otherwise, USCIS has jurisdiction over the
application. Id. § 245.2 (“USCIS has jurisdiction to adjudicate an application for adjustment of status
filed by any alien, unless the immigration judge has jurisdiction.”).
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mental incompetency and the adjustment application would then be filed
with USCIS.
The different burdens of proof for deportability and eligibility for
relief support a bifurcated approach. The government bears the burden
323
of establishing deportability by clear and convincing evidence. With
applications for relief, on the other hand, the respondent bears the full
324
burden of showing eligibility for the relief sought. The differences in
these standards underscore how the deportability determination resembles
a criminal proceeding, where the government brings the charge and bears
the burden of proof. Applications for relief, on the other hand, remain
purely in the hands of the respondent, as when a civil litigant seeks a
remedy from the court. In short, immigration courts serve multiple
purposes and make different types of decisions. Recognizing a right not
to be deported while incompetent need not result in depriving
noncitizens of the ability to pursue legal status in immigration court.
2. Context-Specific Competency Evaluations
While a bifurcated approach to competency would be the easiest
way to handle concerns about applications for relief, another approach is
to ensure that the competency determination takes into consideration
“the actual need for client participation in a particular case” and gives
special weight to the attorney’s judgment regarding the respondent’s
325
ability to assist.
A context-specific assessment of competency is
consistent with the standard in criminal cases, where competency
evaluations should consider “whether the accused’s ability to understand
[and assist with] the process is proportional to the relative complexity
326
and severity of the case.”
For example, a client who cannot give coherent testimony in a
complicated asylum case may be deemed unable to assist and incompetent,
but that same client may be found competent in a different type of case
that relies primarily on documentary evidence and does not require much
327
client participation. This interpretation is consistent with Indiana v.

323. INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2014); Proceedings to Determine
Removability of Aliens in the United States Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a).
324. See, e.g., In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 251–52 (B.I.A. 2007); In re Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec.
373, 386 (B.I.A. 2002).
325. Bonnie, supra note 58, at 564 (recommending approaches that “would substitute the
attorney’s informed judgment about the client’s competence (in relation to the actual need for client
participation in the particular case) for the formal evaluation and, possibly, adjudication, which are
now thought to be required”).
326. King, supra note 288, at 232 (citing ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 7-4.1,
7-5.1, 7-5.2, 7-5.4, supra note 288).
327. In the criminal context, “the same person at the same mental stage might be competent to
proceed to trial in a drug possession case but be incompetent to stand trial in a complex conspiracy
case.” King, supra note 288, at 232.
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Edwards, which instructs “judges to take realistic account of the particular
defendant’s mental capacities” in order to make a competency
determination that is “more fine-tuned” and “tailored to the individualized
328
circumstances of a particular defendant.”
A competency determination should also recognize that the
respondent’s attorney is often in the best position to judge whether the
respondent is able to assist given the specific nature of the case and the
329
level of participation needed. Attorneys usually spend far more time
with their clients than outside evaluators, and the unique nature of their
conversations with clients provides the most relevant experience for
assessing the client’s ability to assist in the manner that a given case
requires. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “defense counsel will
often have the best-informed view of the defendant’s ability to participate
330
in his defense.” Giving special weight to the attorney’s judgment of the
client’s ability to assist also shows respect for the attorney-client
relationship and the attorney’s ethical duty of zealous representation.
Construing competency in this way should create space for attorneys to
proceed with a case when they believe that they can prevail despite the
client’s mental disabilities.

VI. Alternatives to a Right to Competence
Those who remain wary of recognizing a right to competence
because they think it goes too far, exposes clients to even greater dangers
than deportation, or does not permit enough strategic flexibility may be
interested in alternative ways to protect the interests of clients with
serious mental disabilities. This Part sets forth three alternatives and
explains the potential problems with each approach.
A. Discretionary Termination by Immigration Judges
One alternative is for immigration judges to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether to terminate a case based on the respondent’s
331
incompetence. Termination is superior to administrative closure, which
328. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008). John King has argued that Dusky anticipates
this interpretation of competency by “suggesting that the standard for competency could vary based
upon the nature of the proceedings the defendant faces.” King, supra note 288, at 232 (citing Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402–03 (1960) (per curiam)).
329. See Bonnie, supra note 58, at 546 (arguing that the attorney is in the best position to decide
whether the defendant’s competency should be evaluated and noting that this is not the same as saying
that the attorney can “waive” a defendant’s right not to be convicted while incompetent).
330. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450–51 (1992) (holding that allocating the burden of proof
to the defendant to show incompetence does not offend due process).
331. See Molly Bowen, Note, Avoiding an “Unavoidably Imperfect Situation”: Searching for
Strategies to Divert Mentally Ill People Out of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev.
473, 489–502 (2012) (proposing termination by immigration judges and prosecutorial discretion as two
ways to avoid subjecting mentally ill people to removal proceedings).
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simply involves taking a case off of the court’s calendar temporarily
332
because it would ensure that detained respondents are released. Some of
the plaintiffs in the Franco-Gonzalez litigation, for example, languished
in detention for years even after having their cases administratively
closed. While DHS’s new policy should give all incompetent detainees
the right to a bond hearing after 180 days, that does not mean that the
333
bond will be granted. A judge may still find that the respondent is a
danger to the community and refuse to set a bond. In other cases, the
judge may set a high bond and the respondent may not have the means
to post it. Termination is the only way to ensure that prolonged
detention does not occur. Termination also opens the door to applying
for certain types of legal status that cannot be obtained while in removal
proceedings.
The initial problem with this proposal for discretionary termination is
that it remains unclear whether an immigration judge even has the
334
authority to terminate a case unless DHS agrees. In re M-A-M- mentions
335
only administrative closure as a safeguard. Moreover, although the BIA
recently held that an immigration judge has the authority to
administratively close a case over the opposition of DHS, it has never
reversed its longstanding position that an immigration judge lacks the
336
power to terminate over DHS’s opposition. As the Ninth Circuit

332. For example, naturalization applications cannot be adjudicated while in removal proceedings.
See Initiation of Removal Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2013); In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec.
103, 107 (B.I.A. 2007).
333. See INA § 236(a) (Stating that an immigration judge may decide to continue to detain the
noncitizen or set a bond of at least $1500); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing that, in order to be released
on bond, a criminal noncitizen must demonstrate that she is not a threat to national security, that she
does not pose a danger to others, and that she is not a flight risk); id. § 1236.1(c)(8) (same); see also In
re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 576 (B.I.A. 2003) (finding that neither the INA nor the applicable
regulations confer on the alien the right to release on bond).
334. The Immigration Judge Benchbook states that it remains an open question whether or not an
immigration judge may terminate removal proceedings to assure fundamental fairness consistent with
the Due Process Clause. The Immigration Judge Benchbook: Mental Health Issues, Exec. Off. for
Immigr. Rev., Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 2010), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook.
335. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 483 (B.I.A. 2011).
336. See In re Wong, 13 I. & N. Dec. 701, 703 (B.I.A. 1971) (“If enforcement officials of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service choose to initiate proceedings against a deportable alien and
prosecute those proceedings to a conclusion, the special inquiry officer under 8 CFR 242.8 has no
discretionary authority to terminate.”); In re Geronimo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 680, 681 (B.I.A. 1971)
(“Where [deportation] proceedings have been begun, it is not the province of the special inquiry
officer (or of this Board on appeal) to review the wisdom of the District Director’s action in starting
the proceedings, but to determine whether the deportation charge is sustained by the requisite
evidence.”); In re Vizcarra-Delgadillo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 51, 55 (B.I.A. 1968) (holding that the special
inquiry officer had authority to terminate proceedings as “improvidently begun” in a case where
termination was reasonable and both parties agreed to the motion to dismiss); In re Quintero, 18 I. &
N. Dec. 348, 349–50 (B.I.A. 1982) (noting that termination is not a proper means to delay an alien’s
deportation); In re Singh, 21 I. & N. Dec. 427, 435 (B.I.A. 1996) (“As long as the [government]
chooses to prosecute the applicant’s proceedings to a conclusion, the Immigration Judges and this
Board must order the applicant excluded and deported if the evidence supports such a finding.”); In re
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explained decades ago, an “immigration judge is not empowered to
337
review the wisdom of the INS in instituting the proceedings.” Rather,
“[the judge’s] powers are sharply limited, usually to the determination of
whether grounds for deportation charges are sustained by the requisite
evidence or whether there has been abuse by the INS in its exercise of
338
particular discretionary powers.” The current regulation regarding
termination of proceedings by an immigration judge mentions only
termination “to permit the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a pending
339
application or petition for naturalization.” Consequently, although
some immigration judges have taken the initiative to terminate where the
340
respondent is incompetent, many will not do so unless DHS agrees.
Federal courts that disagree with the BIA’s position on termination
may look to a line of cases in the Second Circuit holding that removal
proceedings should be terminated whenever regulatory violations
occurred during the hearing that affect fundamental rights derived from
341
the Constitution or federal statutes. In reaching this conclusion, the
Sanchez-Herbert, 26 I. & N. Dec. 43, 45 (B.I.A. 2012) (“[A]n Immigration Judge may terminate
proceedings when the DHS cannot sustain the charges or in other specific circumstances consistent
with the law and applicable regulations”).
337. Lopez-Telles v. INS, 564 F.2d 1302, 1304 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that the BIA’s decisions
“plainly hold that the immigration judge is without discretionary authority to terminate deportation
proceedings so long as enforcement officials of the INS choose to initiate proceedings against a
deportable alien and prosecute those proceedings to a conclusion”).
338. See id.; see also Yao v. INS, 2 F.3d 317, 319 (9th Cir. 1993) (“As the BIA points out, the IJ was
not empowered to terminate or suspend proceedings once initiated.”).
339. Initiation of Removal Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (2013). This part of the
regulation resembles former 8 CFR § 242.7, which provided a special inquiry officer the discretion to
terminate a deportation proceeding only to permit a noncitizen “to proceed to a final hearing on a
pending application or petition for naturalization,” as long as the noncitizen established “prima facie
eligibility for naturalization” and the case must involve “exceptionally appealing or humanitarian
factors.” See In re Wong, 13 I. & N. Dec. 701, 703 (B.I.A. 1971); see also In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec.
103, 106 (B.I.A. 2007) (discussing when termination is appropriate based on a pending naturalization
application). DHS, on the other hand, is empowered to cancel a notice to appear in a broad range of
situations, including where the notice was “improvidently issued” or where “[c]ircumstances of the case
have changed after the notice to appear was issued to such an extent that continuation is no longer in the
best interest of the government.” See Initiation of Removal Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a)(6)–
(7); see also id. § 1239.2(c); In re W-C-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 118, 122 (B.I.A. 2007) (stating that once
jurisdiction vests with an immigration judge, a notice to appear cannot be cancelled by the DHS, which
must instead move for dismissal of the matter on the basis of a ground set forth in the regulations).
340. For example, an immigration judge sua sponte terminated removal proceedings in the case of
Ever Francisco Martinez-Rivas, a lawful permanent resident from El Salvador who was one of the
plaintiffs in the Franco-Gonzalez litigation, after finding that his schizophrenia rendered him
incompetent and made it impossible to go forward with the proceeding. See Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1042, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Federal District Court Judge Dolly M. Gee
indicated that the immigration judge had correctly terminated the proceedings. Id. at 1048 (“To her
credit, the Immigration Judge terminated the removal proceedings after recognizing that she could not
go forward with the proceeding given Martinez’s mental condition.”).
341. See Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 166–70 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying the Accardi Doctrine,
named after a Supreme Court decision that vacated a deportation order because the procedure did not
conform to the regulations); Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[W]hen a regulation is
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Second Circuit reasoned that the “notion of fair play animating [the Fifth
Amendment due process clause] precludes an agency from promulgating
a regulation affecting individual liberty or interest, which the rule-maker
342
may then with impunity ignore or disregard as it sees fit.” Applying
similar logic, courts could find that removal proceedings should be
terminated if the respondent is deprived of the statutory right to “a
reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against [her], to present
evidence on [her] own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented
343
Because incompetent respondents cannot
by the Government.”
exercise these rights, their cases could then be terminated.
Another option would be for Congress to amend the INA—or for
DOJ to amend the regulations—to specifically give immigration judges
the authority to terminate based on incompetency or, more generally, to
terminate over DHS’s opposition. Once immigration judges have this
authority, attorneys could seek termination for incompetent clients on a
case-by-case basis. While this would allow attorneys to make strategic
decisions about whether to pursue relief or request termination, it would
also give judges enormous discretionary power. Some judges may be
sympathetic and agree to termination, but others may refuse. Empirical
research has documented huge variations in how often judges grant
asylum cases, so it would not be surprising to find similar variations in
344
other types of discretionary decisions. Numerous judges have not
hesitated to issue deportation orders against respondents with obvious
and severe mental disabilities. Their perspective and practice may not
change simply because they are now given the authority to terminate.
B. Prosecutorial Discretion by the Department of Homeland
Security
Another alternative is for DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion
345
with individuals who have serious mental disabilities. DHS could do
this at several different points: ICE officials could decide not to issue a
Notice to Appear when someone shows signs of incompetence; ICE
could decide not to detain that individual; a trial attorney could decide to
retract the Notice to Appear after realizing, perhaps in court, that the

promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal statute, and the
INS fails to adhere to it, the challenged deportation proceeding is invalid and a remand to the agency
is required.”); see also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
342. Montilla, 926 F.2d at 164.
343. INA § 240(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2014).
344. See generally Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Routlette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295 (2007).
345. See Bowen, supra note 331, at 494–502 (discussing prosecutorial discretion as a way to divert
mentally ill individuals from removal proceedings).
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respondent may be incompetent; or the trial attorney could agree to
termination of the case by the immigration judge. A stronger version of
this proposal is for DHS to establish a presumption that prosecutorial
discretion should be exercised in favor of termination in cases in which
the respondent is incompetent. The presumption would act as a policy
that would guide all trial attorneys, instead of leaving it to each
individual’s discretion.
Exercising prosecutorial discretion in this way would be consistent
with the immigration enforcement priorities set forth in the 2011 Morton
Memos, which require ICE to prioritize who should be deported due to
the agency’s limited resources. These memos require ICE to consider
“whether the person . . . suffers from severe mental or physical illness”
and specifically mentions “individuals who suffer from a serious mental
or physical disability” among the classes of people who “warrant
347
particular care.” Exercising prosecutorial discretion would also conserve
tremendous government resources. Under the new DHS/DOJ policy,
pursuing the deportation of individuals with serious mental disabilities will
become much more costly, requiring professional competency evaluations,
competency hearings, and appointed representatives at the government’s
expense. Terminating these cases early on as soon as indicia of
incompetence become apparent—or not filing charges in the first place if
the person is known to have a serious mental disability—would conserve
resources at a time when DHS and DOJ are both experiencing significant
348
budget cuts.
DHS may be reluctant to exercise prosecutorial discretion, however,
if some of the negative factors mentioned in the Morton Memos are also
present, such as cases involving “serious felons, repeat offenders, or
346. See Initiation of Removal Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(a)(6)–(7) (2014) (allowing DHS
to cancel a notice to appear after jurisdiction has vested with the immigration court where the notice
was “improvidently issued” or where “[c]ircumstances of the case have changed after the notice to
appear was issued to such an extent that continuation is no longer in the best interest of the
government”); id. § 239.2 (setting forth grounds on which the DHS may cancel a notice to appear prior
to jurisdiction vesting with the immigration judge).
347. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All
Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, on Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 4–5 (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
348. Doing Business with the U.S. Marshals Service: Notice to Vendors Regarding Sequestration,
U.S. Marshals Serv., http://www.justice.gov/marshals/business (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (“Within
the Department of Justice, sequestration will result in a reduction of over $1.6 billion from the Fiscal
Year 2013 funding level.”); Written Testimony for a House Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency Hearing Titled “The Impact of Sequestration
on Homeland Security: Scare Tactics or Possible Threat?”, DHS Mgmt. Directorate, U.S. Customs &
Border Prot., & U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.dhs.gov/
news/2013/04/12/written-testimony-dhs-mgmt-cbp-ice-and-tsa-house-homeland-security-subcommittee
(mentioning $3.2 billion in budget reductions).
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individuals with a lengthy criminal history of any kind,” or “individuals
349
with an egregious record of immigration violations.” Individuals who
350
entered recently or have any criminal record might also be disfavored.
In cases where such negative factors are present, DHS could take the
position that discretion is not warranted. So far, DHS has generally been
reluctant to exercise discretion. After reviewing almost 300,000 cases
from November 2011 to May 2012, DHS found only seven percent of the
cases eligible for administrative closure, although the numbers could be
351
greater going forward. Relying on prosecutorial discretion is therefore
likely to protect some but not all mentally incompetent individuals. The
power to agree to termination or administrative closure in any given case
would remain entirely in the hands of DHS. Recognizing a constitutional
right to competence, on the other hand, would provide protection across
the board.
C. A Reasonable Accommodation Approach
The reasonable accommodation theory that prevailed in FrancoGonzales was an original and creative argument. While that argument
has not yet been reviewed by the Ninth Circuit or raised in other federal
courts, it prompts interesting questions about the relationships between
reasonable accommodations and substantive due process. On the one
hand, a reasonable accommodation approach seems to conflict with some
of the arguments set forth above for why individuals in removal
proceedings should have a right to competence. It suggests, for example,
that the appointment of an attorney “level[s] the playing field,” placing
352
an incompetent individual on equal footing with competent individuals.
As discussed above, however, an attorney often cannot overcome the
obstacles presented by incompetency. The reasonable accommodation
approach is also limiting insofar as it suggests that only incompetent
individuals in removal proceedings need attorneys to actualize their due
process rights. This Article has explained why those who fail to meet a

349. Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 347, at 5.
350. Id. at 4 (stating that length of presence in the United States is a relevant factor).
351. See Prosecutorial Discretion: A Statistical Assessment, Immigration Policy Ctr. (June 11,
2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/prosecutorial-discretion-statistical-analysis; see also
Prosecutorial Discretion Closed 1 in 4 Cases in Seattle, San Diego, Charlotte Immigration Courts,
TRAC (Aug. 12, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/whatsnew/email.130812.html. While the national figure is
seven percent, the percentage is much higher in certain immigration courts. Id.
352. In rejecting the defendants’ argument that appointment of counsel would place mentally
incompetent detainees in a significantly better position than competent noncitizens in removal
proceedings, the court explained that providing a representative “is merely the means by which
Plaintiffs may exercise the same benefits as other non-disabled individuals, and not the benefit itself.”
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 2013 WL 3674492, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2013). In other words, appointing the
representative “serves only to level the playing field by allowing [mentally incompetent detainees] to
meaningfully access the hearing process.” Id. at *8.
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heightened standard of competence necessary for self-representation
should be appointed attorneys. Moreover, some commentators have
argued that due process requires everyone facing deportation to be
appointed counsel, given the complexities of immigration law and the
extraordinary difficulty that even the most competent individuals face
353
when forced to navigate this system pro se.
On the other hand, there are also ways that a reasonable
accommodation approach may support the types of arguments articulated
above. One of the Supreme Court’s most important disability rights cases,
Tennessee v. Lane, suggests that a substantive right can emerge from a
conglomeration of procedural rights. Lane involved two paraplegic
plaintiffs who could not access Tennessee courtrooms because the
buildings lacked wheelchair access. One of the plaintiffs, George Lane,
crawled up two flights of stairs to attend his first criminal hearing. When
he refused to crawl or be carried up the stairs for the next hearing, he
was jailed for failure to appear. The plaintiffs filed suit under Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, which closely resembles section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, providing that “no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a
354
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” The
issue before the Supreme Court was whether Title II was invalid
legislation because it abrogated states’ sovereign immunity under the
355
Eleventh Amendment.
In finding no Eleventh Amendment violation, the Court reasoned
that Title II sought to enforce not only the equal protection right against
irrational discrimination, but also certain rights protected by the Due
356
Process Clause, which are subject to more searching judicial review.
Specifically, the Court upheld Title II “as it applies to the class of cases
357
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.” The Court
extracted this fundamental right of access to courts from a conglomeration
of rights, including: (1) the right of a criminal defendant to be present at all

353. See, e.g., Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in
Deportation Proceedings, 20 B.C. Third World L.J. 393, 425 (2000). For a thorough review of the
literature on appointment of counsel for noncitizens in removal proceedings, see Eagly, supra note 9.
354. Americans with Disabilities Act § 202, 28 U.S.C. § 12132 (2014). By comparison, section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act similarly provides: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States, as defined in section 705 (20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his or her disability,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012).
355. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 514–15 (2004)
356. See id. at 522–23.
357. Id. at 533–34.
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358

critical stages of a trial; (2) the right of civil litigants to have a
359
“meaningful opportunity to be heard”;
(3) the right of criminal
360
defendants to a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community;
and (4) the right of members of the public to access criminal
361
proceedings. These four rights all implicate procedural due process, yet
the court viewed them in their totality and derived a substantive right of
access to courts. After identifying the fundamental right at stake, the
Court concluded that Title II’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity
362
was justified.
The decision in Lane indicates that constitutional due process
concerns may underlie the duty to provide reasonable accommodations
or, conversely, that the duty to accommodate helps preserve the due
process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Thus, a disability
rights approach to mental incompetency is not completely distinct from a

358. See id. at 523 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)); see also Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137–38 (1934) (holding that procedural due process protects a defendant’s
right to be present during the view of the scene of the crime, which is part of the trial).
359. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 523 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see also
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374 (holding that procedural due process “prohibit[s] a State from denying, solely
because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (holding that Mississippi statutes requiring a
mother to pay $2,352.36 in record preparation fees to pursue her appeal challenging termination of her
parental rights violated due process and equal protection).
360. Lane, 541 U.S. at 523 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)) (holding that
women as a class may not be excluded from jury service or given automatic exemptions based solely
on sex if the consequence is that criminal juries are male). In finding that the fair cross section
requirement is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the court drew on
cases involving due process and equal protection challenges to jury-selection systems. Taylor
effectively overruled Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 68–69 (1961), which had rejected the contention that
a system like Louisiana’s deprived a defendant of due process and equal protection. See Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 828 n.1 (1991) (recognizing that Taylor effectively overruled Hoyt); see
also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (“These principles compel the conclusion that a State
cannot, consistent with due process, subject a defendant to indictment or trial by a jury that has been
selected in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States.”); Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1396 (2010) (Thomas J., concurring) (quoting
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 372 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)) (opining that Taylor rests less on the
Sixth Amendment than on an “amalgamation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
361. Lane, 541 U.S. at 523 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 7
(1986)). While Press-Enterprise held that the First Amendment protects the public’s right to access
criminal proceedings, due process concerns were also implied. The Court observed, “one of the
important means of assuring a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral observers.” Press-Enter.
Co., 478 U.S. at 7. The Court also characterized the right to an open public trial as “a shared right of
the accused and the public, the common concern being the assurance of fairness.” Id.
362. The Court found that Title II’s requirement of program accessibility was congruent and
proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts. In other words, Congress had
the authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
order to enforce that Amendment’s substantive guarantees. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34.
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substantive due process approach.
While Lane involved physical
barriers that deprived people of their fundamental right of access to
court, substantive due process could also be invoked to support a finding
that mental barriers—such as incompetency—deprive individuals of their
right to a reasonably fair removal proceeding. In short, thinking about
the rights of mentally incompetent respondents through the lens of
disability rights might have certain limitations, but it might also open the
door to novel ways of understanding the relationship between procedural
and substantive due process. This approach therefore merits further
thought and exploration.

Conclusion
Until now, discussions about the rights of noncitizens with serious
mental disabilities have been limited to procedural due process concerns,
mainly emphasizing the need for appointed counsel. This Article hopes
to add an important new dimension to the debate by arguing for a
substantive due process right to competence in removal proceedings. If
federal courts are not willing to recognize this constitutional right, then
Congress could create an analogous statutory right. The bottom line is that
the same reasons that underlie the prohibition against trial of criminal
defendants provide strong support for prohibiting the deportation of
incompetent individuals. Courts should not turn a blind eye to these
compelling reasons simply because removal proceedings are technically
labeled civil. Rather, they should consider the reality of what is at stake,
as many states have done in the context of juvenile adjudications.
Recognizing a right to competence in removal proceedings would
impact only a small fraction of cases. Thus, the DHS need not fear that
recognizing this right would obstruct immigration enforcement. For many
individuals with mental disabilities, procedural due process protections will
suffice. These procedural protections can be tailored based on the nature
and severity of a given individual’s disabilities. At least two groups,
however, require special attention in order to preserve the fairness,
accuracy, and dignity of the proceedings. First, those who are legally
incompetent under the Dusky/Drope standard should never be subjected
to removal proceedings. Second, those who fail to meet a higher standard
of competence necessary for self-representation should not be subjected
to removal proceedings unless they are appointed counsel. While
discretionary termination and prosecutorial discretion are alternatives,
they fail to provide across-the-board protections for mentally incompetent

363. Jessica L. Roberts, An Area of Refuge: Due Process Analysis and Emergency Evacuation for
People with Disabilities, 13 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 127, 147 (2005) (arguing that a substantive due
process model will come closer than an equal protection model to achieving the equality of treatment for
disabled persons intended by Congress in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act).
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individuals. Moreover, a disability rights framework imparts new
inspiration and invites further exploration but does not recognize that
simply providing representation to a respondent who cannot assist fails to
resolve concerns about the fairness and accuracy of the proceedings. In
short, only a two-tiered right to competence will protect the most
vulnerable subset of individuals from potentially errant deportations.

